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MINERAL WEALTH VERSUS RESOURCE CURSE – 
THE STAGE IS SET 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The debate regarding the impact of resource wealth being a curse rather than a benefit has been 
a subject of debate since the 1950’s. Only since Sachs and Warner, (1995) the ground breaking 
study which confirmed a negative relationship between resource abundance and economic 
growth for a selected set of countries there has been a narrative termed the ‘natural resources 
hypothesis’. This hypothesis asserts that countries with natural resource abundance tend to grow 
at a slow economic rate than countries with less resource abundance. Africa, being the most 
resource abundant continent compared to all other continents should be the best illustrator of the 
hypothesis because of vast mineral wealth coupled with the high level of poverty on the 
continent. This study seeks to determine if African citizens are on average deemed better or 
worse off given the abundant natural resources endowed in most African countries in relation 
to quality of life and income inequality as a measurement tool. The study further examines the 
effect of resource abundance in African countries, using income inequality as an addition 
variable above the economic growth. 
 
Using a panel data fixed effect estimation model for African countries and Middle East 
countries from 1970 to 2016, the study finds the existence of a U-shaped relationship between 
resource rent and income inequality, which supports the literature regarding the Kuznets curve. 
The study also found that rising consumer price inflation significantly worsens average income 
inequality within an African country. In addition, a high degree of trade openness significantly 
reduces income inequality within an African country, if all else is held constant. 
 
It is thus concluded that for African countries based on the population level, inflation level, 
degree of trade openness, and GDP share of domestic savings, accumulation of more coal rents 
share is expected to worsen average income inequality, while more mineral resource rents share 
reduces income inequality. The study recommends that African countries should find ways to 
measure inequality in their respective countries which would better illustrate the general 
relationship between mineral wealth and income inequality. Equally valuable would be the 
investment in research such as studies and reports which that would track the distribution of 
income over time in countries undergoing a mineral boom.
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
 
The curse of natural resources which the observation that countries rich in natural resources 
tend to perform worse off than their counterparties with less natural resources has been 
empirically shown and analysed in a number of recent studies. (Sachs & Warner, 2001). These 
studies, which include Auty (1993), Gelb (1988), Sachs and Warner (1995, 1999), and 
Gylfason, Herbertson, & Zoega (1999) among others, have emerged late in the 20th century as 
evidence of the poor growth experience of resource-rich countries in the post-World-War II 
period. ( Sachs & Warner, 2001). 
 
“It has been observed for some decades that the possession of oil, natural gas, or other valuable 
mineral deposits and natural resources do not necessarily confer economic success”, as the 
relationship between resources and economic growth is found to be negative. (Frankel, 2010, 
p. 3.). The resource-rich African continent is a great illustrator of this hypothesis as “many 
African countries, such as Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, and the Congo are rich in oil, diamonds, or 
other minerals, and yet their people continue to experience low per capita income and low 
quality of life” (Frankel, 2010, p. 3). 
 
Possessing diamonds has arguably been disastrous for the development of countries like Sierra 
Leone, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, compared to countries like Australia, 
South Africa, or Botswana whose success depends on diamond deposits Boschini, Petterson 
and Roine (2007). Frankel (2010) thus questions how the “abundance of hydrocarbon deposits 
or other mineral and agricultural products could be a curse.” (p. 4). Given that some African 
countries have defied or rather avoided the resource curse while the majority have endured it, 
this study seeks to investigate the relationship between natural resources and income inequality 
in resource-rich African countries. 
 
Simply put, are citizens of resource-rich countries on the African continent worse or better off, 
in so far as it relates to income inequality? “That mineral wealth does not in itself confer good 
economic performance is a striking enough phenomenon, without exaggerating the negative 
effects” according to Frankel (2010). (p. 4). One of the casual observations from empirical 
support confirms that “extremely resource-abundant countries such as the Oil States in the Gulf, 
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Nigeria, Mexico, and Venezuela have not experienced sustained rapid economic growth” 
(Sachs & Warner, 2001, p 828). The finding from “repeated regressions using growth data from 
the post-war period is that high resource intensity tends to correlate with slow growth”, but how 
is this effect explained if we examine income inequality as a variable (Sachs & Warner, 2001, 
p. 828). 
 
The logical deduction drawn from the resource curse hypothesis, in as far as African resource- 
rich countries are concerned, could be that they are better off without the resources. This study 
contends that testing economic inequality against the resource curse literature could result in 
further insights on the impact of natural resource wealth on African resource-rich countries. 
Former Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda has said, “We are in part to blame, but this is the 
curse of being born with a copper spoon in our mouth” (Sarraf & Jiwanji, 2001, p. 3). This 
infers that even African leaders believe in the hypothesis espoused by the ‘resource curse’ 
narrative, without considering whether people are better off or not. 
 
Wright, (2001) quotes from words written by Adam Smith in as early as 1776 where 
Smith states, “Projects of mining, instead of replacing the capital employed in them, 
together with the ordinary profits of stock, commonly absorb both capital and stock. They 
are the projects, therefore, to which of all others a prudent law-giver, who desired to 
increase the capital of his nation, would least chuse to give any extraordinary 
encouragement” (Wright, 2001, p.1). Smith’s statement could be interpreted as signaling 
that resource inspired activity should be considered with caution. 
 
This study seeks to further examine this view. It sets out to examine if the low levels of 
economic growth synonymous with resource wealth translate to countries being worse off, with 
inequality as a measurement variable. 
 
 
1.2 Research Problem 
 
 
To examine the effect of resource abundance in African countries, another variable above the 
economic growth variable, as in the resource curse hypothesis literature, is used, and the 
relationship between resource wealth and income inequality is tested. The African continent 
and other resource-rich developing nations have been characterised by their underperformance 
in economic development measured by Gross Domestic Product. A considerable amount 
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literature investigate “the effects of income inequality on macroeconomic performance, as 
reflected in rates of economic growth and investment” using empirical data from the vast 
numbers of countries as their population (Barro, 2000). 
 
Current research related to the natural resource curse investigates the relationship between 
resource wealth and a variety of variables led by the economic growth, but none seek to 
determine the effects of income inequality on poorer nations and falls short of addressing 
whether developing states are worse or better off as a direct result of the resource abundance. 
Current academic research has to date not directly interrogated the true impact of resource 
wealth on developing states, leaving the matter unresolved.   
 
There are a host of more recent studies since the studies of Sachs and Warner (1995), who 
further explicated the relationship between resource wealth and economic growth, considering 
economic inequality to be examinable (Barro, 2000; Forbes, 2000; Arezki & Van Der Ploeg, 
2011). Apart from Ross (2007), who tried to discover how mineral wealth can affect horizontal 
and vertical inequality, this research study has not encountered any other researcher who 
specifically set out to understand the relationship between resource wealth and inequality. This 
study, however, addresses this gap in research by analysing and evaluating the relationship 
between natural resource wealth and inequality for resource-endowed developing African 
countries and also examines if these countries are better or worse as a result of their resource 
wealth. 
 
1.3 Research Questions and Scope 
 
In light of the discussions above, the objective of this study is to investigate the relationship 
between resource wealth and inequality as compared to the resource curse hypothesis. 
 
As such, the study will set out to answer the following questions and their respective 
hypotheses: 
 
1. Do African countries suffer from the resource curse? 
 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
 𝑯𝟎: There is a negative relationship between resource wealth and economic growth. 
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𝑯𝟏: There is no negative relationship between resource wealth and economic growth. 
 
2. What is the relationship between resource wealth and inequality using African 
countries, and what do the results infer when compared to the resource curse hypothesis? 
 Hypothesis 2: 
 𝑯𝟎: There is no causal relationship between resource wealth and inequality. 𝑯𝟏: There is causal relationship between resource wealth and inequality. 
 
1.4 Organisation of the Study 
 
 
This study is structured as five chapters that proceed as follows. The next chapter, Chapter 2, is 
an extensive review of the literature with a theoretical framework and limitations of the existing 
literature. Chapter 3 explores the analytical framework of the methodology of the research this 
study has undertaken. Chapter 4 discusses the findings of the statistical analyses, where the 
relationship between resource endowment and income inequality is examined by the study. The 
chapter further analyses these findings with a view to deducing an inference from the literature 
regarding the natural resource curse. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the study with a summary of 
the key findings, discussions on the theoretical and empirical significance of the findings in 
relation to literature, and suggestions on avenues for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 
This chapter presents and discusses the reviews academic literature related to the basis of this 
study. It tracks development and the evolution of the narrative related to the resource curse 
hypothesis as articulated by a variety of academic studies. Section 2.2 outlines the theoretical 
framework, section 2.3 presents the empirical studies review. The section on the past literature 
on different variables of the natural resource hypothesis (2.4), is divided into four sub-sections: 
Section 2.4.1 presents the variables for education and development; section 2.4.2 presents 
variables adjusted to periods of study and nominal measure; section 2.4.3 presents the variables 
of institutional quality and capital; section 2.4.4 presents reviews on the variable of dependence 
on natural resources. 
 
Section 2.5. presents review based on institutional quality, section 2.6 presents reviews of 
literature based on different commodities. The chapter goes on further to review African 
diversification cases (section 2.7) before it presents reviews on the studies which support the 
non-existence of the natural resource curse based on limited evidence to conclusively support 
the existence of the resource curse in section 2.8. Furthermore, section 2.10 presents the 
theoretical approach to assessing the determinants of inequality involving the Kuznets curve, 
which is divided into 3 sub-sections: The shift from agriculture to industry affects inequality 
(section 2.10.1); the impact of technology on equality (section 2.10.2) as well as tools to 
measure inequality (section 2.10.3). The chapter concludes by discussing the economic growth 
as a variable in the resource curse narrative. 
 
2.2 Theoretical Framework 
 
 
Countries that have abundant natural resources lag behind resource-poor countries in terms of 
their growth rates. This counter-intuitive relationship is known in the literature as the resource 
curse hypothesis. (Alofaysan, 2017). The term was first used by Auty (1993) to describe how 
countries rich in natural resources seemed unable to use the wealth to boost their economies 
and thus increase their economic growth (Alofaysan, 2017). Sachs and Warner (1995) 
investigated the relationship by examining the effects of natural resources on economic growth. 
They measured national resources, using the ratio of primary exports to 
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Gross National Product (GNP) as proxy, producing findings which suggested negative 
correlation between natural resource exports and per capita GDP growth (Alofaysan, 2017). In 
support of the resource curse, Sachs and Warner (1995) also discovered that a high ratio of 
natural resource exports causes low growth rates due to the subsequent period of their study 
being 1971-1989. 
 
The “natural resource curse is not confined to individual anecdotes or case studies but was born 
from statistical tests of the determinants of economic performance across a comprehensive 
sample of countries” (Frankel, 2010, p. 11). Sachs and Warner (as cited by Frankel, 2010) 
pioneered the “econometric literature, finding that economic dependence on oil and mineral is 
correlated with slow economic growth, controlling structural attributes of the country.” (p. 11). 
Sachs and Warner (as cited by Frankel, 2010) summarised and expanded earlier studies by 
“showing evidence that countries with great natural resource wealth tend to grow slower than 
resource-poor countries” (p. 11.) Furthermore, in the study Frankel (2010) establishes that 
Sachs and Warner find that their results are “not easily explained by other variables or by 
alternative ways to measure resource abundance.” (p.11). The study also finds that there is “little 
direct evidence of geographical or climate variables explaining the curse, or of a bias in their 
estimates from some other unobserved growth deterrent” (Frankel, 2010, p. 11).  
 
This study also investigates the relationship between natural resources and non-resource 
economic activity in resource-rich countries. This relationship has been investigated through 
the literature of the resource curse which was first noted by Sachs and Warner (1995) who 
showed a significantly negative relationship between natural resource dependence and 
economic growth. (Alsharif, 2017). Despite the developing literature in that area, the empirical 
tests of their study suffered from endogeneity. The aim of this study, therefore, is to further 
explore the resource curse hypothesis and provide new evidence regarding the impact of natural 
resources on the level of income inequality and the rate of economic growth by using a specific 
group of African countries as a sample. In addition to the sample of African countries, Middle 
East and non-African countries are used as a control measure to reduce bias. 
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The study examines the relationship between the natural resource endowment and economic 
growth for African countries to introduce the natural resource hypothesis. Then the study seeks 
to test this hypothesis using analytical tools to determine whether African countries would be 
better or worse off in the long run. Thus, the study uses inequality as a measurement tool for 
economic growth. Thus, the aim of this study is to further explore the resource curse hypothesis 
and provide new evidence regarding the impact of natural resources on the level of income 
inequality and the rate of economic growth, using alternative approaches. 
 
The studies undertaken into the evolution of the resource curse hypothesis lack a “universally 
accepted theory of the natural resources curse”, just as there is a lack of a “universally accepted 
theory of economic growth in general” (Sachs & Warner, 2001, p. 833). The resource curse has 
been found to harm growth, as it crowds out activity which is usually a driver for growth (Sachs 
& Warner, 2001, p. 833). According to Sachs and Warner (2001), who seek the complete 
answer to the cause of the natural resources curse and to what ultimately drives growth, some 
form of relationship between resource wealth and growth seems to exist. 
 
2.3 Empirical Studies 
 
 
The curse of natural resources, he observation that countries rich in natural resources tend to 
perform badly, has been shown empirically and analysed in a number of recent studies. These 
studies, including a sizable amount of academic research, have investigated the resource curse 
hypothesis from literature based on data from the cross-sectional specifications of Sachs and 
Warner (1997) in which they use the same indicator to measure natural resources. 
Notwithstanding the studies and observations, according to Alofaysan (2017), there are no 
consensus views on the resource curse, and the literature also has not yet reached a consensus 
on whether natural resources are a curse for the economy. 
 
The findings of Sachs and Warner in their initial investigation of the theory have opened the 
door for numerous findings of different studies related to the relationship between natural 
resources and economic growth. Numerous studies have concerned themselves with this 
relationship, applying different sets of variables to different country samples (Alofaysan, 2017). 
These studies, which include Auty (1990), Gelb (1988), Sachs and Warner (1995, 1999), and 
Gylfason et al. (1999), among others, have emerged late in the 20th century. (Sachs & Warner, 
2001). According to Alofaysan (2017), some of these studies confirm the resource curse 
(Gylfason et al., 1999; Rodriguez and Sachs, 1999), whereas others question its validity 
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(Alexeev & Conrad, 2009;; Van der Ploeg & Poelhekke, 2010). 
 
2.4 Past Literature on Different Variables of the Resource Curse Hypothesis 
 
 
In the past, numerous researchers undertook different studies to determine the effect of 
different variables on the resource curse hypothesis. 
 
2.4.1 The variable of education and development 
 
 
Gylfason et al, (1999) and Gylfason (2001) considered the variables of education and 
development. Education is deemed a variable important to growth, and “resource abundance 
could crowd out entrepreneurial activity or innovation unless the wages in the natural resource 
sector rise to a level high enough to encourage potential innovators and entrepreneurs to work 
in the resource sector” (Sachs & Warner, 2001, p. 835). The argument is further developed that 
natural resources in these countries are concentrated with the influence of government officials, 
proximity to influence over natural resources encourages “rent-seeking and corruption rather 
than pro-growth activities” (Sachs & Warner, 2001, p. 835). Another study points out that 
political progress gets captured in resource abundant economies, which in some way contributes 
to the crowding out of potential innovators and entrepreneurs, resulting in lower activity levels 
and, in turn, lower growth (Auty, 2001). 
 
Doppelhofer, Miller and Sala-i-Martin (2000) tested the robustness of each variable used in the 
studies of Sachs and Warner by computing the probability that the variable belongs to the true 
regression when different control variables are entered. They found strong evidence of the 
resource curse in their study. Sachs & Warner (as cited by Alofaysan, 2017) “classify the natural 
resource curse as one of the most robust relationships” in the economic growth literature. (p. 8)
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2.4.2 Variables adjusted to periods of study and nominal measure 
 
 
Other studies have altered the period of study to test the resource curse hypothesis. Norrbin, 
Pipatchaipoom and Bors (2008) extended the period of study to re-examine the hypothesis. 
They discovered that over an extended period the negative relationship between natural 
resources and growth is robust and that the resource curse appears sensitive to the sample of 
countries in the regression, in which eliminating a single country reduces the significance of 
the result (Alofaysan, 2017). 
 
Similarly, Bruckner (2010) shows that using a measure adjusted to the purchasing power parity 
yields an economically larger negative relationship between per capita GDP growth and natural 
resource dependence than the nominal measure. He goes on to argues that the “commonly used 
nominal measure of natural resource dependence – the share of exports of primary products in 
GNP – understates, in growth regressions, the negative link between natural resource 
dependence and per capita GDP growth” (Bruckner, 2010, p. 1). 
 
2.4.3 The variables of institutional quality and capital 
 
 
Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) empirically examine the direct and indirect effects of natural 
resources on economic growth. They identify potential channels of transmission for the 
resource curse by regressing some explanatory variables, such as institutional quality and 
human capital on natural resource dependence. They conclude that the negative indirect effects 
of natural resources on growth outweigh the positive direct effects (Alofaysan, 2017). On the 
other hand, Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006) provide strong evidence that institutions are 
crucial to the resource curse, a finding that contrasts with the claim of Sachs and Warner that 
institutions do not play a role in the resource curse. 
 
The study of Mehlum, Moene and Torvik, (2006) illustrates that natural resources increase GDP 
growth in countries with more production-friendly institutions but reduce GDP growth in 
countries with counter-productive institutions. Institutions as an explanatory variable was 
further examined by Boschini, Pettersson, and Roine (2007) who investigated the natural 
resource effect on economic development and the dependence between institutional settings 
and the resources of a country. They found that “resource abundance is negative for economic 
development only if the country lacks the proper institutions for dealing with the potential 
conflicts and rent-seeking behaviour which the resources may otherwise bring on.”  
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(Boschini et al., 2007, p. 599). This argument is a healthy point of departure from the practice of 
measuring the resource curse with economic growth a central yardstick.  
 
2.4.4 The variable of dependence on natural resources 
 
 
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) argue that the widely used measure of natural resource 
abundance in the literature, the natural resource exports as a share of GDP, is a misleading 
index. They contend that the index is correlated to dependence on, rather than abundance of, 
natural resources. Their findings cast doubt on the ability of natural resource exports as a share 
of GDP to be used as a suitable proxy. They provide evidence that strong dependence on 
resources slows economic growth (Alofaysan, 2017). Ding and Field (2005) propose two 
different measures of natural resources: firstly, natural resources capital per capita as a measure 
of resource abundance, and secondly, the proportion of total capital that is accounted for by 
resources capital as a measure of resource dependence. They find evidence that strong 
dependence on natural resources has a negative effect on the growth rates of GDP, whereas 
natural resource abundance positively promotes GDP growth (Alofaysan, 2017). 
 
Examining oil endowments and other natural resources on long-term growth, (Alexeev & 
Conrad, 2009, 2011) treat institutions as endogenous and show that records of negative effects 
of natural resource wealth on institutions are likely to be spurious because of the positive link 
between GDP and natural resources. They propose to instrument initial GDP using geographical 
variables to address this issue (Alofaysan, 2017). Thus, the claims of the negative effect of oil 
and mineral wealth on countries’ institutions are called into question (Alexeev & Conrad, 
2009). 
 
2.5 Institutional Quality 
 
 
Boschini et al. (2007) offer two explanation streams for the relationship between resource 
abundance and economic growth, one being economic, and the other political (Alofaysan, 
2017). The economic factor outlines the Dutch Disease (See sub-section 2.9), whereas 
Matsuyama (1992) finds that “the larger the natural resource sector, the smaller the positive 
externalities to enable growth” (Boschini et al, 2007, p. 596). The political factor is 
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supported by works of Ross (2001) who finds that resource abundance increases incentives to 
engage in non-productive activities, such as procuring rent from rent-seeking activities. Both 
factors, however, highlight the imperative need for a good institutional framework. Where good 
institutional frameworks exist, the abundance of natural resources would translate into a broader 
spectrum of economic enrichment, assessed not only by GDP per capita, but also by more 
appropriate indicators, looking to determine whether the living standards in various countries 
are improving, directly or indirectly, from resource wealth (Alofaysan, 2017). 
 
Positive wealth shocks from the natural resource sector (along with consumer preferences that 
translate this into higher demand for non-traded goods) create excess demand for non-traded 
products and drive up non-traded prices, including particularly non-traded input costs and 
wages. The ripple effect of the excess demands is that the input costs of the non-traded products 
are not carried over to the final pricing of such products as they are sold for prices which lead 
to lower returns on the international market. The impact of the lower return, from the pricing 
model hamper the growth processes in certain sectors such as manufacturing, leading to an 
inevitable decline in the sector. (Sachs & Warner, 2001). 
 
2.6 Different Commodities 
 
 
Geography influences the natural resources of various countries, which also affects the 
relationship between different natural resources and economic growth. Some studies have 
examined the resource curse hypothesis in relation to the respective resources of a country, 
claiming that not all resources have the same impact on economic growth. Oil and mineral 
resources, for example, are more negatively related to growth than agricultural resources. 
(Gylfason, 2001)(Murshed, 2004). Another study has challenged these findings and showed 
evidence that oil production, rent, or reserves have a strong positive impact on income and 
economic growth (Cavalcanti, Mohaddes & Raissi, 2011). 
 
In his study, Alsharif (2017, p. 42) suggests that “oil and gas rents have a significant impact on 
export concentration, whereas other renewable resources tend to increase export diversification 
and employment”. His study further identifies a distinction between the impact of natural 
resources and the development stage of a country. He thereby concludes that there is a significant 
positive 
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impact of natural resources on diversification among developed countries, while developing 
countries concentrate more on exports, employment, and value-added growth levels. 
 
Other studies have offered options other than variable diversity as explanations for the resource 
curse. Using a relatively new index of transparency with extensive coverage, both across 
countries and time, Williams (2011) suggests a strong and robust negative causal association 
running from (point) resource export revenues to transparency. His study further suggests a 
negative association between minerals and fuel resource export revenue and transparency, 
where lack of transparency negatively affects economic growth. 
 
On the other hand, Lane and Tornell (1996, 1999) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) offer a 
different explanation for the resource curse; they conclude that the resource curse is based on 
rent-seeking theories. Their respective studies state that natural resources abundance generates 
an incentive for governments to engage in non-productive activities and to provide fewer public 
goods than the optimum. (Alofaysan, 2017). 
 
Other studies by Behbudi, Mamipour and Karami (2010) conclude that human capital could be 
the main factor behind the slow growth of resource-rich countries because such countries 
neglect to develop their human resources. These researchers explore the relationship among 
human capital, resource abundance, and economic growth to explain the hypothesis. (Alofaysan, 
2017). 
 
2.7 African Cases of Specification Versus Diversification 
 
 
The actions or inactions of government influence the impact of resource booms on the levels of 
inequality. For example, “Norway is conspicuous as an oil-producer that is at the top of the 
international league tables for governance and economic performance”. (Frankel, 2010, p. 12). 
However, in Africa, “Botswana and the Congo are abundant in diamonds, yet Botswana is the 
best performer in terms of democracy, stability, and rapid growth of income, while the Congo 
is among the very worst”. (Frankel, 2010, p. 12). Therefore, it can be concluded that 
governments in less-developing states tend to be less bound by the rule of law, have less 
institutional stability, and are more susceptible to rent-seeking and corruption than in the 
advanced industrialised states.  (Ross, 2007). 
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Many of the poorest and most troubled states in the developing world are rich in natural 
resources. According to Ross (2001) “there is a growing body of evidence that resource wealth 
itself may harm a country’s prospects for development.” (p. 328). Most of these resource rich yet 
poor countries are on the African continent, and because of the levels of poverty in Africa, it is 
vital for governments to understand the impact of resource wealth and the manner in which the 
proceeds of the resource exports could be used to change the economy. Mineral booms tend to 
exacerbate regional inequalities under certain conditions: when the extractive region is initially 
wealthy and when growth in the mineral sector outpaces growth in other sectors (Ross, 2007). 
If the region is poor, mineral wealth can aid in closing the gap and reducing inequality in 
contrast to the rest of the globe. 
 
Gylfason (2001) argues that “natural resources could be good for growth, if well managed and 
used to diversify the economy” (Alsharif, 2017, p. 22). Regarding exports Alsharif, (2017, p. 
22) finds that “diversification may help countries to upgrade their resource-based sectors, as 
they move away from unprocessed primary exports to more complex products and services”. 
However, Cadot et al. (2011) argue that “diversification should not be taken as a policy objective 
for two reasons” (Alsharif, 2017, p. 21): First, the importance of specialisation, not 
diversification should be emphasised, following Ricardian theories that also stress the 
importance of specialisation. Second, the Heckscher-Ohlin model, used to evaluate trade and, 
more specifically, the equilibrium of trade between two countries that have varying specialties 
and natural resources, “implies that export patterns are largely determined by endowments, 
drawing attention to factor accumulation, not diversification” .(Alsharif, 2017, p. 22). 
 
However, according to Papageorgiou and Spatafora (2012), “policymakers in developing and 
resource-rich countries are constantly preoccupied with diversification, as they believe it is the 
path towards higher development” (Alsharif, 2017, p. 22). Alsharif (2017) also examines that  
 
“Gylfason (2011) argues that economic diversification could stimulate growth by 
attracting new economic activity that avoids excessive reliance on primary 
production in natural- resource-based industries, thus facilitating the transfer of 
labour from low-paying jobs in low- skill intensive farming and agriculture to more 
lucrative jobs in high-skill intensive occupations, such as manufacturing”. (p. 22) 
 
According to Alsharif, (2017), p. 22) “a higher resource dependency makes diversification more  
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 more difficult, but resource-rich countries want to diversify for a number of reasons established 
from the Gelb and Grasmann, (2010) findings: First, “export diversification is associated with 
higher long-term growth”, as engaging “in manufacturing enables dynamic learning-by-doing, 
which raises productivity and income”. Second, “diversification exposes producers to a wider 
range of information about foreign markets and may open the way to other sectors”. (Alsharif, 
2017, p. 22). 
 
2.8 No Evidence of the Resource Curse 
 
 
In the literature, there is no consensus on the natural resource curse hypothesis. While studies 
reviewed thus far support the existence of the resource curse and offer different variables as 
explanations for the relationship between natural resource abundance and economic growth, 
some studies have found no evidence of the curse. According to Frankel (2010, p. 12), among 
the “statistical studies, Delacroix (1977), Davis (1995), and Herb (2005) all find no evidence of 
the natural resource curse”. 
 
Unlike most scholars who confirm the negative effects of resources on economic growth on 
cross-sectional data, other scholars, such as Manzano and Rigobon (2001) test the relationship 
between natural resources and growth using panel data, which shows no evidence for the 
resource curse. Their studies show that the negative effect of resources on growth could be 
attributed to the fact that primary exports as a fraction of GNP, which is the most common 
measure of resources in the literature, is correlated with unobservable characteristics. 
 
In his study, Maloney (2002) found that numerous resource-rich economies have been far more 
dynamic than those in Latin America, and there is little long-term evidence that natural resource 
abundant countries generally underperform. He concluded that there are two factors that 
distinguish Latin America from the more successful experiences of Scandinavia or Australia. 
Firstly, deficient national learning or innovative capacity arising from low investment in human 
capital and scientific infrastructure led to weak ability to innovate or even take advantage of 
technological advances abroad. Secondly, the period of inward-looking industrialisation 
created a sector whose growth depended on artificial monopoly rents rather 
 
 
than the quasi-rents arising from technological adoption, which undermined resource-intensive 
sectors that had the potential for dynamic economic growth (Maloney, 2002). 
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In addition, Alexeev and Conrad (as cited by Frankel, 2010) discovered that oil and mineral 
wealth have positive effects on income per capita, when controlling several variables, 
particularly in East Asia and Latin America. In the analysis of the Alexeev and Conrad study 
(as cited by Frankel, 2010,) found that the reason “different studies have different results is that 
oil wealth may raise the level of per capita income while reducing or failing to raise the growth 
rate of income”. (p.12) 
 
What is observed in the review of the studies that do not support the existence of the natural 
resource curse is the question of the proxy for natural resource abundance. In some cases, 
“natural resource wealth is measured by true endowments, or rather by exports” (Frankel, 2010, 
p.12). In his survey analysis study of the natural resource curse, Frankel (2010) arrives at an 
approach over which sceptics “argue that natural resource exports are highly endogenous in 
several ways”. (p. 12).  Frankel (2010) further advances the narrative that on “the one hand, basic 
trade theory readily predicts that a country may show a high mineral share in exports, not 
necessarily because it has a higher endowment of minerals than other countries (absolute 
advantage) but because it does not have the ability to export manufactured goods (comparative 
advantage)”. (p. 12). The finding of the study offers “a strong explanation for negative statistical 
correlations between mineral exports and economic development, an explanation that would 
invalidate the common inference that minerals are bad for growth” (Frankel, 2010, p. 12). 
 
“Cases of countries that were able to develop efficiently their resource endowments 
as part of strong economy-wide growth include: the United States during its pre-
war industrialisation period, Venezuela from the 1920s to the 1970s, Australia since 
the 1960s, Norway since its oil discoveries of 1969, Chile since adoption of a new 
mining code in 1983, Peru since a privatisation programme in 1992, and Brazil 
since the lifting of restrictions on foreign mining participation in 1995” (Frankel, 
2010, p.13).  
 
These cases that Frankel outlined are examples wherein institutions and industries have a 
complementary relationship with the development of mineral resources. 
 
On the other hand, examples of countries that were “equally well-endowed geologically but 
failed to develop their natural resources efficiently were Chile and Australia before World War 
16  
I and Venezuela since the 1980’s” (Frankel, 2010, p. 13). As a result, it is not a given conclusion 
that countries with oil wealth will perform worse than those without it. From the finding in 
support of the natural resource curse, a logical deduction would be that a “country with oil or 
other natural resources would be better off destroying them or refraining from developing 
them”, which contests resource wealth as an agent to growth and development. (Frankel, 2010, 
p. 13) 
 
Frankel (2010) also finds that resource-rich countries can succeed. As a case study, Botswana 
best illustrates that resource abundance can be positively related to growth. At its independence 
in 1966, Botswana was among the 25 poorest countries in the world (Sarraf & Jiwanji, 2001). 
The diamond and copper-nickel wealthy nation developed itself using the mineral sector as a 
dominant part of the economy. According to Sarraf and Jiwanji (2001), Botswana went from 
being a lower-middle income country in 1989 to an upper-middle income economy by the end 
of 1998. Additionally, between 1966 and 1989, Botswana was the fastest growing global 
economy with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth at an average of 13.9% per annum 
between 1965 and 1980, at an average of 11.3% between 1980 and 1989, and at an average of 
4.75% between 1990 and 1998 (The World Bank, 1998, 1991, 2001). 
 
Some research has provided little agreement on why the relationship exists, while various 
authors have contributed to the subject matter. Most of the research relies on “resource-rich 
African countries and their growth performance but do not make provision for the different 
socio, political, and institutional quality factors that these African countries experience” 
(Boschini, Pettersson & Roine, 2007). The current literature is seemingly light on its 
examination of the relationship between resource abundance and inequality using comparable 
indicators amongst African countries.  
 
A study by Sachs and Warner (2001) showed that resource-intensive economies tended to have 
high price levels regarding the relationship between economic growth, resource wealth, and 
inequality, which aroused curiosity as part of this study. What is examined in this study is the 
relationship between inequality and resource abundance. The method of study carried out by 
Goderis and Malone (2011) lays an interesting foundation for researchers seeking to examine the 
relationship between the resource curse and inequality. In their study, they define “a natural 
measure of non-resource income inequality, based on the factor distribution of income, and 
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they relate this measure to the Gini coefficient of non-resource income inequality in the 
economy” (Goderis & Malone, 2011, p. 392). 
 
The study goes on to concentrate on the ratio of the total wage income earned by skilled workers 
to the total wage income earned by unskilled workers. Goderis and Malone (2011) find that 
structural measure of non-resource inequality produces output, which is “a multiple of the value 
share of unskilled labour-producing output and that the relative factor of returns are key drivers 
of inequality of the personal income distribution”. They admit that their findings are consistent 
with the studies of Daudey and Garcıa-Pe˜nalosa (2007). 
 
Natural resource booms have an impact on income inequality in the short-run and the long-run, 
as the resource boom affects the transitions of the economy over a period of time. (Torvik, 
2001) considers productivity growth in a specific factors model without explicit consideration 
of the role of skilled versus unskilled labour. Furthermore, Torvik (2001) makes it possible to 
study” the level of inequality in the balanced growth steady state in response to resource booms” 
(Goderis & Malone, 2011). 
 
2.9 Dutch Disease 
 
 
The literature on the relationship between natural resources and non-resource economic activity 
focuses on the concept of the Dutch Disease, originally named by the Economist magazine on 
26 November 1977 and inspired by repercussions of “natural gas discoveries by the Netherlands 
in the late 1950s” (Frankel, 2010, p. 19). The disease existed when an increase in natural 
resource revenue led to an appreciation of the real exchange rate, which increased the cost of 
other industries’ exports in foreign currency and caused a decline in the manufacturing sector, 
the most conducive sector to growth. (Alofaysan, 2017; Corden & Neary, 1982). Corden and 
Neary (as cited by Taguchi & Khinsamone, 2018) described the Dutch disease model “as the 
resource reallocation from tradable sector to non-tradable sector caused by positive shocks from 
the natural resource sector.” (p. 251). 
 
In his analysis of the impacts of the Dutch Disease on Asian economies, Usui (as cited by 
Taguchi and Khinsamone, 2018) argued that the Dutch Disease could be avoided due to policy 
adjustments, such as the currency devaluation in 1978 and the subsequent accumulation of 
budget surpluses”. (p. 252). Pangestu (2010), on the other hand, emphasised “the existence of 
the Dutch 
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Disease in Indonesia during that period by demonstrating that the currency devaluation in 1978 
only provided temporary relief to the non-oil-traded-goods sector” (Taguchi & Khinsamone, 
2018, p. 252). Taguchi & Khinsamone’s study also discovered that the resultant lack of 
manufacturing activities on an economy might make the economy stay at a resource-rich status. 
 
The African government, as the case of Nigeria, seldom took charge of the effects of the Dutch 
Disease. Thus, the economy suffered because of government’s failure to act in the early 1960s 
and 1970s when an increase in Nigerian exports led to the strengthening of the exchange rate 
(Ross, 2007). The higher exchange rate made it largely unviable for local firms in certain sectors to be 
competitive on a global basis (Ross, 2007). A sharp rise in Nigeria’s petroleum exports in the 1960s 
and early 1970s led to an appreciation of the exchange rate, and instead of devaluating the 
currency, fearing the inflation, the Nigerian government kept it overvalued (Ross, 2007).  As 
the oil sector becomes more profitable as a direct consequence of the sharp rise in petroleum 
exports, this comes at the expense of other domestic sectors such as agriculture and 
manufacturing, as these sector decline. (Ross, 2007)  
 
During the same period, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Indonesian government acted to protect its 
economy by adopting programmes directed towards the poor. They took measures to enhance 
agricultural production and devalued the exchange rate, thus ensuring its exports remained 
competitive and shielded the poor, which the Nigerian government did not do (Ross, 2007). 
The actions of the Indonesians led to the country’s Gini coefficient remaining low and stable 
between 1970 and 2000, while Nigerian’s Gini coefficient was significantly higher. 
 
2.10 The Evolution of Inequality 
 
 
The main “theoretical approach to assessing the determinants of inequality involves some 
version of the Kuznets (1955) curve, developed further by Robinson (1976) who focused on the 
movements of persons from agriculture to industry”. (Barro, 2000, p. 8). In this model, the 
“agricultural and rural sector initially constitutes the bulk of the economy”, featuring lower 
capita income and “relatively little inequality within the sector”. (Barro, 2000, p. 8). Barro, 
(2000), p. 8) further states that “the industrial and urban sector starts out small, has higher per 
capita income, and a relatively high degree of inequality within the sector”. 
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2.10.1 The shift from agriculture to industry affects inequality 
 
 
“Economic development involves, in part, a shift of persons” and resources “from agriculture 
to industry”. (Barro, 2000, p. 8). The industry migration leads to increases in the per capita 
income, as growth in the new industries requires more people to employ. According to Barro 
(2000), the rise in employment changes the country’s overall degree of inequality. 
 
At the early stages of development, which is after the resource boom for resource abundant 
countries Barro, (2000) records that a positive relationship exists between product per capita 
and inequality. As things progress, and as entry-level employees move from the agricultural 
sector to the industrial sector, they also move up in the income earner’s list. According to 
Barro’s findings, as workers move into industries at the expense of agricultural work, the 
agricultural sector diminishes. As a result, the decreasing size of the agricultural labour force 
increases relative wages in that sector and combined with the substitution for more people 
because of the growth of new industries, indexes of overall inequality reduce. (Barro, 2000). 
 
Therefore, the relationship between the level of per capita product and extent of inequality is 
positive at the later stages of the development cycle (Barro, 2000). Barro (2000) further 
elaborates that the “full relationship between an indicator of inequality, such as a Gini 
coefficient and the level of per capita product, is described by an inverted-U, which is the curve 
named after Kuznets.” (p. 9). The description of the relationship between the short-run and 
long-run periods, coupled with the impact on inequality on the same periods, would be amplified 
during resource booms. 
 
2.10.2 The impact of technology on equality 
 
 
Barro (2000) quotes another variable that has an impact on inequality is technology; many 
technological innovations initially tend to raise inequality. As more people move into a sector, 
“inequality tends to rise along with expanding per capita product.” (Barro, 2000, p. 9). 
Subsequently, as more people take advantage of the superior techniques,” inequality tends to fall 
as in the case of the move from the agricultural to industrial sector” (Barro, 2000, p. 9). To 
justify this effect, the 
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poor sector may be the user of an old technology, whereas the rich sector employs more recent 
and advanced techniques (Aghion & Howitt, 1997; Galor & Tsiddon, 1997; Helpman, 1997). 
 
2.10.3 Tools to measure inequality 
 
 
While the Kuznets curve has been widely regarded as a good tool to explain inequality as 
economies develop, there are studies that suggest that the relationships the Kuznets curve 
outlines have weakened. Anand and Kanbur (as cited in Barro, 2000) in their study argue “that 
the Kuznets curve works better across countries at a point in time than for the evolution of 
inequality over time.”  (p. 9). Barro (2000) also finds that this “curve explains relatively little 
of the variations in inequality across countries over time.” (p. 10). Thus, the use of the Kuznets 
curve has become an out-of-date tool of explaining inequality. 
 
 
A more commonly used measure of income inequality is the GINI coefficient, which “comes 
from the Lorenz curve, which graphs cumulated income shares versus cumulated population 
shares, when the population is ordered from low to high per capita incomes” .(Barro, 2000, p. 
14). Computed as “twice the area between the 45-degree line that extends north-eastward from 
the origin and the Lorenz curve”, the Gini, according to Theil (1967), shows a “weighted 
average of all absolute differences between per capita incomes where the weights are the 
products of the corresponding population shares”. (Barro, 2000, p. 14-15). 
 
2.11 Economic Growth 
 
 
Persson and Tabellini (1991) suggest that inequality is harmful to growth and that “in a society 
where distributional conflict is more important, political decisions produce economic policies 
that allow private individuals to appropriate less of the returns to growth promoting activities, 
such as accumulation of capital and productive knowledge”. (p. 1).  Furthermore, they find that 
there are statistically significant negative relations between inequality and growth (Persson & 
Tabellini, 1991). 
 
In assessing the inequality as per the Kuznet-curve theory, Persson and Tabellini (1991) find 
that there is “a strong negative relation between income inequality at the start of the growth 
period”. The study further identifies that economic growth is largely determined by 
accumulating knowledge of production, with incentives for such production “hinged on the  
21  
 
ability of individual to private appropriate the fruits of their efforts”. Which are dependent on 
tax policies and adopted regulatory policies (Persson & Tabellini, 1991, p. 1). Policy 
deliberation, left to politicians, results in policies which lead to less gross because of less private 
appropriation and accumulation. 
 
This studies literature review begins with evidence that the ‘resource curse hypothesis’ lack a 
universally accepted theory as it seeks to define the hypothesis. This study then proceeds to 
examine different variables, such as education which is seem as an important variable to 
economic growth. The influence of government officials and their proximity to decision making 
and policy is reflected in the rent-seeking and corruptive practices is also touted as a viable 
consideration in the examination of the resource curse narrative. This studys review of literature 
also offered arguments for the use of other variable to measure the impact of the resource curse 
over and above the use of economic growth as a measurement tool. 
 
The relationship between natural resource abundance and economic growth is further explained 
in the studies literature review as a result of political (rent-seeking activities) and economic 
reasons (Dutch disease). Furthermore, different commodities classes, from different 
geographical locations seems to illicit a varying impact on economic growth and income. This 
certainly emphasised the need for differentiation in the examination of the resource curse 
narrative especially on the African continent given the various resources on the continent. The 
resource concentration impacts exported diversification and even employment patterns. A 
constant theme in the literature review was that the decision-making ability or indecisiveness 
of countries during resource booms, aided by good institutions was a crucial consideration 
based on how government responded to resources booms. There are also school of thought who 
find that there is no evidence of the existence of the resource curse.
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CHAPTER 3 – METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 
This chapter presents and stipulates the method of research this study seeks to undertake. The 
section on the research design (3.2), presents the plan for the study and how the research 
activities will be undertaken. Section 3.4 presents the data source, period, and sample; section 
3.5 presents the population of the study. Section 3.6 presents the analytical framework with a 
sub-section 3.6.2 presenting the regression equations for the economic growth and income 
inequality analysis. Furthermore, section 3.7 presents a list of variables used in the regression 
analysis. The chapter concludes by discussing the estimation techniques used in the regression 
analysis. 
 
3.2 Research Design 
 
 
McMillian and Schumacher (2001) state that research design is a plan for a study that sets out 
the activities to be undertaken, such as data collection procedures and sampling strategy to 
provide answers to the research questions. The academic research undertaken by this study was 
carried using the quantitative method of data collection. According to Jonker and Pennink 
(2010), quantitative research is often regarded as purely scientific, justifiable, precise, and fact- 
based in exact figures. Anyone who conducts quantitative research wants to know the degree 
to which something (a phenomenon or a specific kind of behaviour) occurs or not, and if it does, 
to what degree (Jonker & Pennink, 2010). This study seeks to explore the effects of the resource 
curse hypothesis on a listed panel of African countries and to analyse the impact of the resource 
curse with inequality as an independent variable. The research process undertaken can be 
described as an empirical cycle focused on deduction according to Jonker and Pennink (2010). 
 
This study uses a panel data fixed effect estimation model for African countries and Middle 
East countries from 1970 to 2016. This period was selected so that the research would more 
recent, covering time periods first included in the Sachs and Warner (1995) study and extending 
the periods until as recent as possible given the availability of data. The data is drawn from the 
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World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) and the Association for the Study of Peak 
Oil and Gas (ASPO). The measures of natural resource rents, refer to the wealth generated from 
the resource sector that represents the difference between the value and the cost of resource 
production. Following Alofaysan (2017), the resource rents are measured as shares of GDP 
from different types of resources, such as coal, minerals, natural gas, and oil. 
 
In this study first, the analysis uses the panel data to examine the resource curse hypothesis and 
its impact of African countries on natural resource endowment. It tests the relationship between 
resource wealth and rates of economic growth for the panels of countries selected. Second, 
which is the main element of this research, income inequality as an instrumental variable is used 
to test the resource curse hypothesis amongst African resource-rich nations. As part of the 
second test, this study seeks to explore an area of research that might aid the academic 
conversation in relation to the resource curse hypothesis. 
 
As a control measure for the examination to be undertaken by this study, we test for 
multicollinearity among the independent variable, using a VIF test to check the degrees of 
correlation amongst the variables. “Resource-rich countries differ in their dependence on 
natural resource rents, and other features are likely to influence the effect of resources, such as 
level of development and region” (Alsharif, 2017, p. 36). We also set out to determine if 
heterogeneity is affected by the diversification given the two major resource classes on the 
African continent are minerals or oil resources. 
 
3.4 Data Source, Period, and Sample 
 
 
Data involves all the information the researcher collects during research (Jonker & Pennink, 
2010). This study analysed existing numerical data, using various estimation techniques. 
Secondary data refers to the statistical material, which is not created by the researcher but 
obtained from someone else's records. For this study, the most appropriate data came from the 
secondary data as the source of information. 
 
This analysis collected data by carrying out searches of relevant studies in Wiley journals, 
Google Scholar, and World Bank databases. Similar combinations of keywords by Havranek, 
Horvath and Zeynalov (2016) were used. For example, ‘‘natural resource + economic growth,” 
‘‘natural resource + inequality,” and ‘‘Dutch Disease”. For the natural resource hypothesis and 
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its relationship with economic growth, available information from credible sources was also 
used, such as the World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files, 
as primary sources for the comparison of country-specific financial and economic indicators. 
The basic period of comparison will be indexed on annualised periods to render comparable 
research. 
 
In the collection for country-specific indicators, relevant data from World Bank Development 
Indicators was obtained, as well as Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas. For the 
analysis on the impact of inequality on economic growth, this study will also use secondary 
data from the African Development Indicators database compiled by the World Bank. The 
general sample period will be annualised. 
 
3.5 Population 
 
 
The size of the sample is determined by the optimum number necessary to enable valid 
inferences to be made about the population (Marshall, 2018). The study will use resources- 
endowed African states as the population. As not all African states are suitable for this study, 
the approach will be to use a selection of the countries which will represent demographic 
representation of the resource-rich African countries, resource-poor African countries, and 
African countries with resource contribution around the median mark of resource wealth. The 
study has limited information from African countries, which would not have been useful to the 
regression analysis. As a result, the researcher obtained data relating to Middle Eastern 
countries, which was used as a random selection to minimise the bias. In Figure 7 (See 
Appendix 1: List of Figures), the names of the countries used in the study are listed. 
 
3.6 Analytical Framework 
 
 
3.6.1 Regression equation 
 
 
The quantitative study concerning economic rates and resource endowment is carried out using 
the time series model. The quantitative study regarding the effect of inequality on economic 
growth in resource-endowed countries is a combination of the panel estimation and time series 
design. Panel estimators control the differences in time-invariant, unobservable country 
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characteristics, removing bias results from the correlation of the characteristics and the 
explanatory variables (Forbes, 2000). 
The first regression model in this study is as follows: 
 
 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ*,, = 𝛽/ + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡8  + ∑;   𝑋*,, + 𝛿* + 𝑢* ,, (1) 
*,, < =1 			 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒	𝑖	and 𝑡	represents country and year respectively; 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ	 is the average annual GDB 
growth rate; ResouceRent	 is the Total natural resource rent as percentage of GDP; and𝑋	
represents a vector potential covariates of growth; 𝛿	− represents the country fixed effects; 𝑢	
−𝑖𝑠	𝑎𝑛	𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟	𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑎𝑙𝑙	𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟	𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑	𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠, 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	𝐸(𝑢)=0 ∀	𝑖	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑡. 
 
 
The identification strategy for the first regression model is depicted as follows: 
 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝑖𝑡	, 𝑢1,𝑖𝑡| 𝑋1,𝑖𝑡′, 𝛿1,𝑖=0 
 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝑖𝑡	, 𝑢1,𝑖𝑡| 𝑋1,𝑖𝑡′, 𝛿1,𝑖=𝐸𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡∗	𝑢1,𝑖𝑡𝑋1,𝑖𝑡′, 𝛿1,𝑖=0 
 
The second regression model in this study is derived from Forbes (2000), applied specifically 
to resource-rich African countries. As a proxy for inequality in this study, the Gini coefficient 
is used. The regression model is as follows: 
 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖*,,	=	𝜃/	+	𝜃1𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡*,,	+	+𝜃8𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡8		+	𝜃U𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒*,,	+	𝜃W𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒8		+	∑;			𝐾* ,,	+	𝜂*	+	𝜙,	+	𝑢*,,	 (2) *,,	 <=1			
Where Gini],^	is the Gini coefficient of a (net) country 𝑖	in year 𝑡	and Resource rents refers to 
our fiscal measure of natural resource richness. 
 𝑋2,𝑖𝑡′ is a vector meant to capture correlation of income inequality; 𝛿2,𝑖	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝜆2,𝜏	denote the 
country and year effects respectively. 𝑢2,𝑖𝑡	is the error term 
 
3.7 Definition of Variables 
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This study uses a list of selected variables (defined in the table below), which were used in the 
regression analysis and the descriptive statistics: 
 
Table A: List of variables used in regression analysis 
 
Gini Coefficient Gini coefficient of income inequality (net of taxes and transfers). 
Index ranging between 0 and 100, with larger values corresponding 
to more unequal income distributions. This study uses the Log 
(Gini) 
Source: Solt (2009) SWIID data 
Income Contemporaneous, 1-year and 5-year lagged real GDP per capita 
(constant 2010 US dollars) 
Source: World Bank (2018) 
Log Income Natural Logarithm of Income Variable Source: World Bank (2018) 
Natural Resource Rents Contemporaneous, 1-year and 5-year of the share of Total Natural 
Resource Rents in GDP 
Source: World Bank (2018) 
Log (Oil Wealth per Capita) Logarithm of oil reserves per capita/100 (zeroes were replaced by 
minimum positive value). Retains interval ratio differences. 
Source: Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas (ASPO) via 
Cotet & Tsui (2013) 
Log (population) Log of total population age between 15 and 64. 
Source: World Bank (2018) 
Democracy 
Economic growth 
Democracy – democracy index obtained from polity2 index 
Source: Polity IV via Cotet & Tsui (2013) 
 
The growth variable will be based on log GDP as a proxy where : 
cdefi 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ*, = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 b  gh jk n c i 
gh   jklm 
EA denotes the Economically Active aged between 16 and 64, for the 
openness variable, we made the assumption that those with missing 
values had zero imports and exports. 
 
 
3.8 Estimation Techniques 
 
 
This study carried out statistical research, using the following estimation techniques: 
 
1. Pooled OLS Model: In this study, no assumption on individual country differences were 
made. There was also a test for autocorrelation and homoscedasticity. 
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𝑦𝑖𝑡=𝛿+𝑥𝑖𝑡′𝛽+	𝑢𝑖𝑡		 𝛽𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑑=𝑋′𝑋−1𝑋′𝑦		 𝐸𝑢𝑖𝑡=0,	𝐸𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑡′=𝜎2𝐼,	𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑋=𝐾+1<𝑁𝑇,	𝐸𝑢𝑋=0		
2. Two-way Effects Model: This allows intercept to vary over i and t 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡=𝛿𝑖+𝜆𝜏+𝑥𝑖𝑡′𝛽+	𝜀𝑖𝑡		
3. Individual-Specific Effects Model. In this model, four short panel time-effects are 
included as dummies in 𝑥𝑖𝑡′		 𝑦𝑖𝑡=𝛿𝑖+𝑥𝑖𝑡′𝛽+	𝜀𝑖𝑡		
4. Random coefficients model allows slopes to vary over i 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡=𝛿𝑖+𝑥𝑖𝑡′𝛽𝑖+	𝜀𝑖𝑡		
This study further considered Fixed Effects versus Random Effects. It seeks to correlate 
between 𝛿𝑖	and 𝑥𝑖𝑡. Fixed effects explore the relationship between Natural Resource Rents and 
economic growth within a country. This study also considered that each country has its own 
individual characteristics, which may or may not influence natural resource wealth. In some 
countries, the political system could affect the extraction of natural source wealth based on the 
rule of law or implementation of legislation policy. Furthermore, when using fixed effects, this 
study assumes that some factors within a country may have an impact or a bias on the oil wealth 
or conflict variable, so control for this possibility is needed. This is done by assuming that the 
countries’ fixed error term and natural resource rent predictor variable are correlated. Fixed 
effects removes the effect of those time-invariant characteristics, so the net effect of the 
predictors on the outcome economic growth variable can be assessed. 
Another important assumption of the fixed effects model is that time-invariant characteristics 
are unique to a specific country and should not be correlated with other countries’ 
characteristics. Thus, each country’s error term and the constant, which captures individual 
characteristics, should not be correlated with other countries. Should the error terms be 
correlated, then fixed effects would not be suitable, as the inference may not be correct. As a 
result, this study would need to model the relationship, most likely using random effects. In 
such a case, the Hausman test can be used to assess if random effects are more appropriate
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CHAPTER 4 – DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents and discusses the findings from the regression analysis of the study on 
which the conclusion and recommendations are based. The section on the regression analysis 
(4.3), presenting the non-parametric regression model, is divided into five sub-sections: Section 
4.3.1 presents the disaggregated commodity impact check; section 4.3.2 presents the oil wealth 
and income represented by GDP per capita; section 4.3.3 presents the impact of wealth on 
economic growth and examines if the resource curse is real; section 4.3.4 presents the 
relationship between income inequality and the natural resource curse; and section 4.3.5 
presents the country’s fixed effects for natural resources and income inequality. 
 
Furthermore, section 4.4 presents the outcome of various tests for multicollinearity before 
addressing the validity and reliability of the analytical techniques. The chapter concludes by 
discussing the limitations observed in the chapter’s findings. 
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 below present the descriptive statistics of the variables used for this study. The 
descriptive statistics of both the Non-African and African countries are outside the squared 
brackets in the Table 1 below. The descriptive statistics of both African and Non-African 
countries are outside the squared brackets in the table below, whereas descriptive statistics for 
the sample of only African countries are inside the squared brackets.  
 
Table 1: List of select variables used in regression analysis and descriptive statistics 
 
  Africa   All Sample 
Variable Name Mean Std Dev Min/Max   Mean Std Dev Min/Max 
Gini 44.37 6.797 30.4/63.3   43.14 7.106 27.3/ 63.3 
Income (US$) 1624.64 1908.69 182.71/16413.54   3568.32 8276.1 182.71/72670.96 
Log Income 6.91 0.931 5.21/9.71   7.23 1.209 5.21/ 11.20 
Natural Resource Rents 10.45 10.592 0/63.55   10.55 11.376 0/63.55 
Log (Oil Wealth per Capita) 0.02 0.04344 -2.391891892   0.0141 0.04398 -1.94505 
Log (population) 15.392 1.373 10.96/ 8.25   15.369 1.379 10.96/ 18.25 
Democracy 0.00215 0.00171 .0005/.0085   0.00524 0.00391 0/0.1 
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4.3 Multicollinearity 
 
In order to isolate the relationships between independent variables, which is a core objective of 
a regression analysis, this study tested for multicollinearity using the VIF test method. The 
outcomes of this analysis are as follows: 
 
Output 1 Panel B: African countries - Column (7). 
	
    Variable  VIF 1/VIF 
resourcere~s  9.88 0.101174 
resrentSQU~D  9.6 0.104194 
openness  2.8 0.357095 
logpop  2.6 0.384743 
logGDP70  1.71 0.585197 
gross_save  1.42 0.706163 
cpiinflation  1.09 0.921477 
  Mean VIF  4.16  
	
 
 
 
For Output 1, Panel B: African countries (above), VIF tests as part of a multicollinearity test 
were carried out. In the test for column (7), the mean VIF is 4.16, where the resource rent VIF 
result is 9.88, and resource rents squared is 9.60, which are both below the 10.0 mark, the rule 
of thumb. 
 
Output 2 Panel B: Non-African countries-Column (5). 
 
    Variable  VIF 1/VIF 
 logpop 39.17 0.025527 
resource~s 6.58     0.152055 
Iyea~1997 6.49     0.154132 
resrentS~D 5.83 0.171452 
openness 1.29     0.775518 
gross_save 1.22     0.821209 
cpiinfla~n |    1.04 0.964698 
  Mean VIF  6.98  
 
 
 
 
For Output 2, Panel B: Non-African countries (above), VIF tests as part of multicollinearity test 
were also carried out. In the test for column (5), the mean VIF is 6.98, where the resource rent 
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VIF result is 6.58. A sensitivity analysis VIF was then created, dropping the population as a 
variable, which resulted in a mean VIF of 2.63, where the VIF result is 6.54. For this VIF, there 
were 1384 observations with the R-squared value at 0.103. These results indicate that inflation 
stifles growth rates within African countries, while a high degree of open trade accelerates 
annual growth rates. This table concludes from the VIF test results that natural resource effect 
on annual growth rates is not robust, as is evident of the fixed effect estimator. 
 
Output 5 Panel B: African countries -Column (7). 
 	
    Variable  VIF 1/VIF 
income_sq 139.11     0.007189 
income 134.18     0.007453 
logpop 42.05 0.023782 
resource~s 7.12     0.140490 
yea~1983 4.89     0.204467 
resource~q 6.10 0.164015 
openness 1.45     0.688474 
gross_save 1.44    0.696627 
cpiinfla~n |    1.24 0.807647 
  Mean VIF  28.64  
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For Output 5, Panel B: African countries (above), the VIF values for resource rent and resource 
rents square are 7.12 and 6.10 respectively, with the rule of thumb of values less than 10. 
Assuming all other OLS assumptions are met, the results infer that the estimates suggesting a 
non- monotonic relationship between resource rents and income inequality are reasonable. The 
VIF values for income and population are greater than 10, which signals signs of 
multicollinearity in relation to those two variables. The study then carried out VIF sensitivity 
checks, dropping the variables of population, income squared, and years 2015 and 2016 
dummies. The sensitivity check has a mean VIF of 2.62, while resource rents and resource rents 
squared have VIF values of 6.81 and 5.96 respectively. 
 
All the VIF values are less than 10, with resource rents and resource rents squared being 6.81 
and 5.96 respectively. Thus, dropping the higher degree correlated variables of population, 
income squared, and years 2015 and 2016, improved the significance and the point estimates. 
The underlying conclusion of a significant U-shaped relationship between resource rents and 
income inequality is maintained. Thus, in rich natural resource African countries, more resource 
rent accumulation is likely pocketed by the elite and less by the poor, worsening, on average, 
income inequality within the countries. 
 
From the VIF test carried out, it is observed that at a 10% level of significance, the rise in 
consumer price inflation is predicted to significantly worsen average income inequality within 
African countries. At the 5% significance level, a high degree of trade openness is predicted to 
significantly reduce income inequality within an African country, if all else is constant. This 
would support those advocating policies for high-degree trade openness rather than protecting 
those in Africa in the fight of alleviating high-income inequality. 
 
At the 10% significance level, higher gross domestic savings share in GDP is predicted to 
significantly reduce income inequality. This continues the theme of encouraging African 
countries to prioritise improving the domestic savings share vis-à-vis debt-driven economic 
growth and curtailing income inequality. In summary, addressing overall issues of 
multicollinearity, not just for interest, enabled better insight into the significant impacts of 
inflation, trade openness, and gross domestic savings, after controlling for the level of tax on 
international trade. 
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4.4 Regression Results 
 
 
Using the regression estimates for equation 1, this study carried out a pooled OLS estimation 
test which concluded using the Wald test for joint significance ( or regression usefulness) that 
suggestions of joint significance existed. The p-value of the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier 
(LM) test is less than 5%, thus the null hypothesis that the pooled OLS is appropriate rejected. 
In other words, there is significant evidence of differences across countries, although limited 
by the small goodness of fit measures (R-squared between 0.1% and 8.7%), the test appeared 
to exhibit some worthwhile theoretical links. The pooled OLS estimator exhibited, a negative 
coefficient on linear resource rents tentatively suggests that, all else held constant, more total 
natural resource rents accumulated by an average country are predicted to stifle average annual 
growth. 
 
The negative and less-than-one coefficient indicates that relatively poor countries entering the 
1970–2016 transitional period are predicted to grow faster on average than the relatively richer 
countries if all else is held constant in the same conditional, steady state. If this test is valid, the 
conjecture made by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) that natural resources have a non-monotonic 
effect on economic growth, may be plausible for African countries. An inverted U-shaped 
relationship indicates that initially, low- resource-endowed countries experience high growth 
rates with additional resource rents acquired, while the richer resource countries experience 
stunted economic growth rates with more rents accumulated. However, as the estimates of the 
random effects model) indicate, the relationship is not a robust one, most likely due to omitted 
variable or endogeneity bias not dealt with. The p-value of the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
multiplier (LM) test is large, thus the null hypothesis that the pooled OLS is appropriate cannot 
be rejected. This indicates there is no significant evidence of differences across the sampled 
Middle East countries 
 
This study further analyses the following six middle eastern countries: Iran, Iraq, Israel, Malta, 
Oman, and Saudi Arabia and observes that there is a heavy oil dependence amongst these 
countries, resulting in some sample selection bias. Nonetheless, the finding seems to generally 
support the view that natural resources have been both a blessing and a curse for the middle 
eastern region. This could be explained, but the political realities of these countries are such 
that they have dictators investing in repressive mechanisms rather than in the key determinants 
of economic growth. 
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The recent spate of impressive growth rates experienced by two seemingly outliers to the natural 
curse hypothesis in the Middle East, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates has raised questions 
about the validity of such economic growth rates. Kurecic and Kokotovic (2017) question the 
validity of these impressive rates of growth in Oman. Furthermore, the doubt cast validity of 
the claim that Oman has a negative saving rate. As a test to ensure that African countries do not 
encounter the same question relating to the integrity of reporting, this study undertakes a 
disaggregated commodity impact check to rest the natural resource curse hypothesis. 
 
In the Hausman Wald test (see Table 1.1) we carried out we found that openness, savings and 
inflation significant at the 5% level with more openness and more domestic savings boosting 
growth rate, while higher inflation stifles growth rate. These are illustrated by the conclusion 
of the summary of the test carried out below. 
 
Table 1.1: Hausmann Wald Test Observation  
 
(LSDV-Fixed Effects) Test Stats Decisions 
Country Effects F- value 17288.33*** Country effects significant 
Year Effects F-value 102.07*** Year effects significant 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian 
multiplier test for random effects 
 
Robust Hausman 10.77*** Reject Pooled OLS estimator in favor of Random Effects estimator 
Sargan-Hansen statistic (p-value) <0.001 Reject Random Effects estimator in favor of Fixed Effects estimator 
CONCLUSION The Fixed Effects Estimator used is appropriate as estimated using the two-way LSDV 
estimator 
 
 
 
As part of the study we modelled various tests which suggested that using the 2-way fixed model 
was appropriate, paying particular attention to country effects and year effects. 
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One of the models we carried out seemed to suggest that when we control for share of taxes 
only country fixed effects should be controlled. Hence we choose the model variation without 
tax which we found to be appropriate for our study. 
 
Table 2. Panel A: Based on the expected Beta convergence estimates, that is a negative 
coefficient on initial income and as argued in Barro, (2000) the Solow model predicts that 
convergence is achieved when, where overshooting (and leap frogging ) are considered as not 
plausible. Thus for ALL countries we would take the pooled OLS models in column 1 and 2, 
and the fixed effects model in column 6 as the ones conforming to expected Beta convergence 
and thus used for contrasts. Column (2) suggests that All else held constant a 10% increase in 
Value of Oil Reserves is predicted to decrease economic growth by approximately 0.254% on 
average and is statistically significant at the 5% level. Controlling for year and country fixed 
effects and the level of democracy the negative effect is marginally significant at the 10% level 
of testing. 
 
After controlling for year and country fixed effects the negative relationship between Natural 
Resource Rents and economic growth rates for All countries in Table 2, we found with the 
biased pooled OLS estimator is no longer significant in any of the specifications. This lends 
support to the literature that finds the Natural Resource curse hypothesis to be not robust. The 
Sargan-Hansen statistic of the robust hausman test offers support for the fixed effect Estimation. 
From Table 2 PANEL A: All countries, column (7), ceteris paribus, growth in the country 
population, lowering of consumer prices, a higher degree of trade openness and a rise in 
domestic share of savings are predicted to drive up economic growth rates. 
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TABLE 2: TOTAL RESOURCE RENTS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (WDI DATA SET: 1970–2016) 
 LSDV- 
Fixed 
Effects 
LSDV- 
Fixed 
Effects 
LSDV- 
Fixed 
Effects 
LSDV- 
Fixed 
Effects 
LSDV-Fixed 
Effects 
GLS 
Random 
Effects (RE) 
LSDV- 
Fixed 
Effects 
GLS 
RE:Trade 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable: Growth=log GDP per EA(t)/GDP per EA (t-1)) 
PANEL A: ALL COUNTRIES 
Resource Rents 0.000474 0.000664 0.000543 0.000563 -0.000846 -0.000846 0.000440 0.000440 
 (0.000389) (0.000784) (0.000746) (0.000752) (0.000767) (0.00102) (0.000979) (0.00104) 
Resource Rents Squared  -3.16e-06 -1.63e-05 -1.66e-05 8.44e-06 8.44e-06 -5.04e-06 -5.04e-06 
  (1.50e-05) (1.38e-05) (1.46e-05) (1.41e-05) (1.52e-05) (1.46e-05) (1.16e-05) 
Initial income         
log [GDPEA70]   0.0146 0.0199 -0.131*** -0.131** -0.319*** -0.319*** 
   (0.0154) (0.0323) (0.0499) (0.0563) (0.0646) (0.0634) 
Log (population)    -0.00412 0.0469* 0.0469 0.114*** 0.114*** 
    (0.0221) (0.0273) (0.0380) (0.0423) (0.0425) 
      -3.13e-  -2.41e- 
Consumer Price Inflation     -3.13e-06 06*** -2.41e-06 06*** 
     (2.28e-05) (3.30e-07) (2.71e-05) (5.93e-07) 
Openness (Exports + Imports)/GDP)     0.000374*** 0.000374** 0.000163* 0.000163 
     (8.99e-05) (0.000153) (8.92e-05) (0.000121) 
Gross Domestic Savings (% of GDP)     0.000628** 0.000628* 0.000606** 0.000606* 
     (0.000301) (0.000327) (0.000289) (0.000368) 
Taxes on International Trade         
(% of Revenue)       -6.79e-07 -6.79e-07 
       (0.000301) (0.000378) 
Constant 0.0473*** 0.0460*** -0.0687 -0.0448 0.303 0.303 0.703*** 0.703*** 
 (0.0159) (0.0161) (0.118) (0.179) (0.275) (0.234) (0.264) (0.258) 
Number of Countries 65 65 43 43 43 43 35 35 
Observations 
R-squared 
2,653 
0.117 
2,653 
0.117 
2,003 
0.127 
2,003 
0.127 
1,606 
0.169 
1,606 589 
0.364 
589 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. LSDV standard errors are calculated by bootstrapping (200 repetitions) 
- Time dummies are jointly significant and Country dummies are jointly significant. LSDV- denotes Least Squares Dummy Variable Estimator 
 
 
 
In Table 2, PANEL B: African countries, it is found that after controlling for population level 
and year and country fixed effects, the inverted U-shaped relationship between natural resource 
rents and economic growth rates for African countries is statistically strong, as depicted in 
column (4). The Wald test for joint significance of the linear and quadratic terms of the resource 
rents is very small for all regression models, suggesting that the natural resource curse 
hypothesis would have an impact on the low-resource countries, while resources are a blessing 
for the rich-resource countries. This suggests that low-resource-endowed African countries 
experience high growth rates with additional resource rents acquired, while the richer resourced 
African countries experience stunted economic growth rates with more rents accumulated. But 
when it is controlled for the level of inflation, the degree of trade openness, and the domestic 
savings and taxes on trade, it is found that the relationship is not robust.
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In Table 2, PANEL C: Non-African countries, it is found that after controlling for population, 
inflation, trade openness, savings level, and year and country fixed effects, the U-shaped 
relationship between natural resource rents and economic growth rates for African countries is 
statistically strong, as depicted in column (5). The Sargan-Hensen statistic of the robust 
hausman test offers support for the Fixed Effects Estimation. From column (7) cateris paribus, 
the growth in the country population, lowering the consumer prices, a higher degree of trade 
openness and a rise in domestic share of saving are predicted to drive up economic growth rate, 
also supporting the literature that resource curse hypothesis is not robust.
 
TABLE 2: TOTAL RESOURCE RENTS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (WDI DATA SET: 1970–2016) 
 LSDV- 
Fixed 
Effects 
LSDV- 
Fixed 
Effects 
LSDV- 
Fixed 
Effects 
LSDV- 
Fixed 
Effects 
LSDV-Fixed 
Effects 
GLS 
Random 
Effects(RE) 
LSDV- 
Fixed 
Effects 
GLS 
RE:Trade 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable: Growth=log (GDP per EA(t)/GDP per EA (t-1)) 
PANEL B: AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
Resource Rents 0.000269 0.000859 0.00174** 0.00170** 0.000467 0.000467 0.000787 0.000787 
 (0.000475) (0.000830) (0.000767) (0.000678) (0.000762) (0.000770) (0.00119) (0.00118) 
 -4.30e- -4.21e-   
Resource Rents Squared  -1.01e-05 05*** 05*** -1.52e-05 -1.52e-05 1.98e-06 1.98e-06 
  (1.91e-05) (1.55e-05) (1.46e-05) (1.55e-05) (1.49e-05) (1.86e-05) (1.44e-05) 
Initial income     
log [GDPEA70] 0.0100 -0.0179 -0.136*** -0.136*** -0.252*** -0.252*** 
 (0.0165) (0.0405) (0.0513) (0.0464) (0.0762) (0.0892) 
Log (population)  0.0217 0.0551* 0.0551* 0.0747 0.0747 
  (0.0302) (0.0290) (0.0297) (0.0541) (0.0616) 
   -3.22e- -1.95e- 
Consumer Price Inflation   -3.22e-06 06*** -1.95e-06 06*** 
   (2.66e-05) (3.61e-07) (2.27e-05) (6.50e-07) 
Openness (Exports +     
Imports)/GDP)   0.000412*** 0.000412** 8.65e-05 8.65e-05 
   (9.18e-05) (0.000171) (0.000103) (0.000107) 
Gross Domestic Savings     
(% of GDP)   0.000471 0.000471* 0.000240 0.000240 
   (0.000292) (0.000273) (0.000240) (0.000292) 
Taxes on International Trade     
(% of Revenue)    -0.000164 -0.000164 
    (0.000288) (0.000389) 
Constant 0.0378*** 0.0333** -0.0510 -0.174 0.190 0.190 0.762** 0.762** 
 (0.0129) (0.0154) (0.127) (0.223) (0.285) (0.167) (0.318) (0.336) 
Number of Countries 
  
37 37 30 30 
Observations 
R-squared 
2,156 
0.119 
2,156 
0.119 
1,737 
0.141 
1,737 
0.142 
1,384 
0.165 
1,384 454 
0.407 
454 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. LSDV standard errors are calculated by bootstrapping (200 repetitions) 
- Time dummies are jointly significant and Country dummies are jointly significant. LSDV- denotes Least Squares Dummy Variable Estimator 
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TABLE 2: TOTAL RESOURCE RENTS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (WDI DATA SET: 1970–2016) 
 LSDV- 
Fixed 
Effects 
LSDV- 
Fixed 
Effects 
LSDV- 
Fixed 
Effects 
LSDV- 
Fixed 
Effects 
LSDV- 
Fixed 
Effects 
GLS 
Random 
Effects(RE) 
LSDV- 
Fixed 
Effects 
GLS 
RE:Trade 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable: Growth=log( GDP per EA(t)/GDP per EA (t-1)) 
PANEL C: NON-AFRICAN COUNTRIES (MOSTLY MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES) 
  -  
Resource Rents 0.00156* 0.00161 -0.00309 -0.00292 0.00555** -0.00555* -5.22e-05 -5.22e-05 
 (0.000835) (0.00266) (0.00194) (0.00211) (0.00218) (0.00310) (0.00398) (0.00204) 
   5.92e- 5.73e- 8.14e- 8.14e-  - 
Resource Rents Squared  -8.19e-07 05** 05** 05** 05*** -0.000114 0.000114*** 
  (3.29e-05) (2.60e-05) (2.81e-05) (3.55e-05) (2.60e-05) (8.47e-05) (3.19e-05) 
Initial income    
log [GDPEA70]   0.000914 -0.00891 0.0765 -0.0914 3.028*** -0.354** 
   (0.0215) (0.0381) (0.0595) (0.121) (0.781) (0.168) 
Log (population) -0.00863 0.0673 0.0673 0.242*** 0.242** 
 (0.0317) (0.0613) (0.0771) (0.0633) (0.113) 
Consumer Price Inflation  0.000260 0.000260 9.84e-05 9.84e-05** 
  (0.000263) (0.000169) (0.000277) (4.75e-05) 
Openness (Exports +    
Imports)/GDP  1.65e-05 1.65e-05 0.000447 0.000447 
  (0.000285) (0.000317) (0.000492) (0.000462) 
Gross Domestic Savings (% of    
GDP)  0.00187** 0.00187*** 0.00352*** 0.00352*** 
  (0.000808) (0.000692) (0.00105) (0.000514) 
Taxes on International Trade    
(% of Revenue)  -0.000936 -0.000936 
  (0.00109) (0.000808) 
Number of Countries 
 
6 6 5 5 
Observations 
R-squared 
497 
0.240 
497 
0.240 
266 
0.289 
266 
0.289 
222 
0.410 
222 135 
0.543 
135 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. LSDV standard errors are calculated by bootstrapping (200 repetitions) 
- Time dummies are jointly significant and Country dummies are jointly significant. LSDV- denotes Least Squares Dummy Variable Estimator 
 
 
 
4.4.1 Disaggregated commodity impact check 
 
 
To assess the impacts of resource rents along disaggregated commodity lines, the analysis was 
undertaken using the following rents: coal rents, mineral rents, oil rents, forest rents, and natural 
rents. The results presented in Table 3 controlled for population, inflation, trade openness, 
savings level, and year and country fixed effects. The model was estimated for all three sample 
classifications using the pooled OLS, random effects and fixed effects techniques. The African 
countries frame, which comprises of at least 72% of the ALL sample data, indicates that more 
forest rents stifle growth. The coefficient for coal was observed to be positive for African 
countries but negative for Non-Africa countries. The estimated coefficients, although marginal 
indicates that coal rents stimulate economic growth among African countries. This conclusion 
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seems to suggest that forest resources suffer from the resource curse. This could be an 
interaction with other resource industries, manifesting in the form of the Dutch Disease. On the 
other hand, based on pooled and random effects models, coal rents seem to be a blessing to 
boosting economic growth in average African countries. For Middle East (or Non-African) 
countries, mineral rents and forest boost economic growth, while natural gas rents and coal 
rents seem to stunt average economic growth rates. 
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TABLE 3: EFFECTS OF NATURAL RESOURCE RENTS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH: RESOURCE CLASS IMPACTS 
 ALL COUNTRIES AFRICAN COUNTRIES NON-AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
 
 
Dep. Variable: Economic 
Growth 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
Pooled OLS Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Pooled OLS Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Pooled 
OLS 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
 
Natural Resource: 
         
Coal Rents 0.00126 0.00343 0.00354 0.00489* 0.00479* 0.00146 -2.192*** -1.505 -0.869 
 (0.00274) (0.00372) (0.00439) (0.00255) (0.00279) (0.00379) (0.226) (0.967) (1.661) 
Mineral Rents 0.000325 0.000584 0.000780 0.000443 0.000275 0.000698 0.0627*** 0.0524* 0.0312 
 (0.000500) (0.000641) (0.000540) (0.000486) (0.000500) (0.000623) (0.0154) (0.0277) (0.0438) 
Oil Rents -2.88e-05 0.000135 0.000176 9.11e-05 0.000182 0.000405 -0.000493 -0.000109 1.30e-05 
 (0.000371) (0.000358) (0.000475) (0.000291) (0.000313) (0.000526) (0.000689) (0.000573) (0.00118) 
Forest and Agric Rents -0.00136*** -0.00149*** -0.00185* -0.00134*** -0.00156*** -0.00208** 0.0722** 0.0580 0.0862 
 (0.000391) (0.000553) (0.00100) (0.000384) (0.000366) (0.000999) (0.0203) (0.0530) (0.433) 
       -   
Natural Gas Rents -0.00359 -0.00203 0.000645 0.00218 0.00142 -0.00246 0.0226*** -0.0200*** -0.00974 
 (0.00348) (0.00376) (0.00536) (0.00277) (0.00229) (0.00566) (0.00399) (0.00336) (0.0160) 
Initial income       -   
log [GDPEA70] -0.00892** -0.0110*** -0.120** -0.0142*** -0.0132*** -0.0585 0.0234*** -0.0187*** 0.0789 
 (0.00367) (0.00369) (0.0543) (0.00330) (0.00341) (0.0523) (0.00356) (0.00356) (0.0582) 
Log (population) 0.00318* 0.00188 0.0392 0.00325 0.00148 0.00292 -0.00802 -0.00956** 0.0911 
 (0.00168) (0.00230) (0.0273) (0.00204) (0.00207) (0.0311) (0.00413) (0.00399) (0.0555) 
 -4.32e- -3.05e-  -4.16e- -3.29e-     
Consumer Price Inflation 06*** 06*** -2.74e-06 06*** 06*** -2.69e-06 4.61e-05 0.000294* 0.000184 
 (3.28e-07) (4.00e-07) (2.29e-05) (3.03e-07) (4.07e-07) (2.73e-05) (6.92e-05) (0.000157) (0.000175) 
Openness (Exports +          
Imports)/GDP 0.000309*** 0.000274*** 0.000349*** 0.000342*** 0.000261*** 0.000398*** -0.000116 -8.65e-05 0.000231 
 (7.16e-05) (0.000105) (9.41e-05) (8.19e-05) (9.38e-05) (9.40e-05) (0.000116) (0.000136) (0.000282) 
Gross Domestic Savings          
(% of GDP) 0.000212 0.000176 0.000418 0.000167 6.65e-05 0.000250 0.00155** 0.000991*** 0.00205** 
 (0.000275) (0.000288) (0.000375) (0.000257) (0.000242) (0.000395) (0.000507) (0.000277) (0.000822) 
Constant 0.00366 0.0639 0.318 0.0342 0.0695 0.396 0.329*** 0.334*** -2.262 
 (0.0341) (0.0471) (0.278) (0.0338) (0.0450) (0.287) (0.0660) (0.0795) (1.414) 
 
Observations 
 
1,447 
 
1,447 
 
1,447 
 
1,229 
 
1,229 
 
1,229 
 
218 
 
218 
 
218 
R-squared 0.070  0.192 0.080  0.190 0.173  0.386 
 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. LSDV standard errors are calculated by bootstrapping (200 repetitions) 
 
Time dummies included in Random Effects Estimator. LSDV- denotes Least Squares Dummy Variable Estimator and controls for time and country fixed effects. 
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4.4.2 Oil wealth and income 
 
This study sought to further analyse the relationship between resource abundance, represented 
by oil wealth, and income represented by GDP per capita. Given the limited data on African 
natural resource information, it was found that oil wealth had more information available for a 
wider range of African countries. As oil wealth represented a large share of the natural resources 
on the continent, it was a viable variable for research consideration. This study has thus carried 
out statistical analysis, using oil wealth in its hypothesis to test the relationship of growth to the 
resource curse and to income inequality. Oil wealth data obtained from WDI and ASPO data 
was used. 
 
On the horizontal axis of Figure 3 (See Appendix 1: List of Figures), average oil wealth 
represents the mean of log value of oil reserves from the period 1929 to 2008 for the same 
countries used in the regressions reported in Table 2. On the vertical axis, the average income 
is computed as the mean of log GDP per capita over the same sample of countries and years 
using the ASPO data. For both the oil African and non-African countries, the association is 
positive and statistically significant. 
 
4.4.3 Oil wealth impact on economic growth: Is the natural resource curse real? 
 
 
Table 4, PANEL A: All countries, is based on the expected Beta convergence estimates, which 
is a negative coefficient on initial income. As argued by the Solow growth model, it also 
predicts that convergence is achieved when 0<𝛽<1	and where overshooting (𝛽>1)	and leap 
frogging (𝛽=1) are not plausible. Thus, for all countries we would take the pooled OLS models 
in column (1) and (2) and the fixed effects model in column (6), the ones conforming to 
expected Beta convergence, and use them for contrasts. Column (2) suggests that, all else held 
constant, a 10% increase in the value of oil reserves is predicted, which would decrease 
economic growth by approximately 0.254% on average and is statistically significant at the 5% 
level. When year and country fixed effects and the level of democracy are controlled, the 
negative effect is marginally significant at the 10% level of testing in which it is lessened. 
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TABLE 4: OIL WEALTH AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (ASPO DATA SET: 1970–2008) 
Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled 
OLS 
FIXED 
EFFECTS 
OLS 
FIXED 
EFFECTS OLS 
FIXED 
EFFECTS 
OLS 
FIXED 
EFFECTS 
OLS 
FIXED 
EFFECTS 
OLS 
  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 Dependent Variable: log (GDP per capita/GDP per capita 1970)   
PANEL A: ALL COUNTRIES    
Log GDP70 -0.305*** -0.116*** -1.237*** -1.226*** -1.221*** -0.257*** -1.222*** 
 (0.0276) (0.0180) (0.0437) (0.0414) (0.0400) (0.0281) (0.0400) 
logvaloilres  -0.0254*** -0.00687** -0.00689** -0.00484* -0.00484* -0.00489* 
  (0.00309) (0.00285) (0.00268) (0.00266) (0.00268) (0.00267) 
democracy  -0.000880  
  (0.0333)  
Ldemocracy   -0.0138 
   (0.0333) 
 - - -     
Constant 0.00629*** 0.00235*** 0.00261*** -0.00193*** -0.00151*** -0.000804*** -0.00149*** 
 (0.000559) (0.000387) (0.000361) (0.000639) (0.000282) (0.000282) (0.000272) 
 
FIXED EFFECTS 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
TIME EFFECTS NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,992 1,718 1,718 1,718 1,718 1,707 1,708 
R-squared 0.279 0.178 0.826 0.841 0.839 0.695 0.747 
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
In Table 4, PANEL B: African countries, column (4) shows the expected Beta convergence 
estimate, and after controlling for country and year fixed effects, a 10% rise in the value of oil 
reserves is predicted to decrease economic growth by approximately 0.0603% on average and 
is marginally significant at the 10% level. Although still negative, the effect is not statistically 
significant when the level of democracy is controlled within that African country. This result 
appears to support the strand of empirical evidence, which conjectures that the quality of 
political institutions explains some of the conditional natural resource curse phenomena (the 
so-called weak state mechanism hypothesis). Therefore, it could be argued that it is not that 
natural resources are a curse in Africa but that the quality of the democracy and the corruption 
is contributing to the mismanagement and embezzlement of the value of oil reserves. 
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TABLE 4: 
 
OIL 
 
WEALTH AND ECONOMIC 
 
GROWTH 
 
(ASPO DATA SET: 1970-2008): AFRICAN CO 
 
UNTRIES 
Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled 
OLS FIXED 
EFFECTS 
OLS 
FIXED 
EFFECTS OLS 
FIXED 
EFFECTS OLS 
FIXED 
EFFECTS OLS 
FIXED EFFECTS 
OLS 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 
Dependent Variable: log (GDP per capita/GDP per capita 1970) 
  
 
PANEL B: AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
   
logGDP70 -0.231*** -0.238*** -0.224*** -0.240*** -0.242*** -0.243*** -0.243*** 
(0.0450) (0.0568) (0.0320) (0.0381) (0.0361) (0.0359) (0.0358) 
logvaloilres 0.0109 -0.0203*** -0.00603* -0.00443 -0.00431 -0.00442 
 
(0.0108) (0.00312) (0.00360) (0.00270) (0.00266) (0.00271) 
democracy 
 
-0.0415 
 
  
(0.0675) 
 
Ldemocracy 
  
-0.0612 
   
(0.0670) 
- -   
Constant 0.00774*** 0.00772*** -0.00570*** -0.00290** -0.00325*** -0.00323*** -0.00323*** 
(0.000864) (0.00120) (0.000998) (0.00143) (0.000740) (0.000737) (0.000737) 
 
 
FIXED EFFECTS 
 
 
NO 
 
 
NO 
 
 
YES 
 
 
YES 
 
 
YES 
 
 
YES 
 
 
YES 
TIME EFFECTS NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Observations 395 345 345 345 345 340 340 
R-squared 0.270 0.263 0.856 0.939 0.933 0.803 0.803 
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
In Table 4, PANEL C: Non-African countries, columns (2) and (6) suggest that in controlling 
the level of democracy and fixed effects, the effect is not statistically significant. Thus, the 
pooled OLS estimator in column (2) seems to be biased in the downward estimates due to not 
controlling for unobserved country heterogeneity. 
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TABLE 4: OIL WEALTH AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (ASPO DATASET: 1970-2008): NON-AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled 
OLS 
FIXED 
EFFECTS 
OLS 
FIXED EFFECTS 
OLS 
FIXED 
EFFECTS OLS 
FIXED 
EFFECTS OLS 
FIXED EFFECTS 
OLS 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent Variable: log (GDP per capita/GDP per capita 1970)   
 
PANEL C: NON-AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
  
logGDP70 -0.319*** -0.0852*** -1.237*** -1.238*** -1.234*** -0.272*** -1.235*** 
 (0.0320) (0.0157) (0.0437) (0.0416) (0.0417) (0.0261) (0.0420) 
logvaloilres  -0.0299*** 0.00130 0.000346 0.00200 0.00184 0.00175 
  (0.00273) (0.00332) (0.00329) (0.00338) (0.00339) (0.00338) 
democracy -0.0286  
 (0.0365)  
Ldemocracy  -0.0432 
  (0.0365) 
 - -      
Constant 0.00589*** 0.00105*** -0.00253*** -0.00249*** -0.00200*** -0.00124*** -0.00192*** 
 (0.000656) (0.000335) (0.000314) (0.000671) (0.000290) (0.000284) (0.000273) 
 
FIXED EFFECTS 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
TIME EFFECTS NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,597 1,373 1,373 1,373 1,373 1,367 1,368 
R-squared 0.285 0.176 0.789 0.794 0.792 0.670 0.748 
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
Table 5, PANEL A: All countries, suggests that the pooled OLS regressions for all countries in 
the sample (72% of whom are African countries) supports the Kuznets curve hypothesis that an 
inverse U-shaped relationship is present between net income inequality and the level of 
economic development. The statistical evidence is strong in column (8) in which the level of 
population, price stability, trade openness, domestic savings, and taxes on international trade 
are controlled for. Furthermore, the linear and quadratic terms on natural resources are not 
statistically significant, suggesting a non-robust relationship amongst all countries. The 
negative quadratic coefficient suggests that natural resources relate to lower inequality for the 
very high levels of natural resource dependence, while income inequality is high in poor natural 
resource countries. But this relationship is not statistically significant. 
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TABLE 5: EFFECTS OF NATURAL RESOURCES ON NET INCOME INEQUALITY (POOLED OLS BASELINE) 
 
Dependent Variable(log) 
 
Gini(1) 
 
Gini(2) 
 
Gini(3) 
 
Gini(4) 
 
Gini(5) 
 
Gini(6) 
 
Gini(7) 
 
Gini(8) 
 
PANEL A: ALL COUNTRIES 
 
Income (t) 
 
-0.0154 
 
0.352* 
 
0.373* 
 
0.416** 
 
0.428** 
 
0.473** 
 
0.413* 
 
0.758*** 
 (0.0232) (0.196) (0.199) (0.197) (0.200) (0.212) (0.218) (0.234) 
Income Squared (t)  -0.0221* -0.0231* -0.0258** -0.0262** -0.0282** -0.0253** -0.0430*** 
  (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0119) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0129) 
 
Resource Rents (t) 
 
-0.00177 
 
-0.00130 
 
0.00124 
 
0.00299 
 
0.00276 
 
0.00271 
 
0.00191 
 
0.00650 
 (0.00132) (0.00131) (0.00391) (0.00373) (0.00371) (0.00375) (0.00348) (0.00466) 
Resource Rents Squared (t)   -5.86e-05 -8.81e-05 -8.03e-05 -6.58e-05 -5.03e-05 -5.29e-05 
   (7.86e-05) (7.45e-05) (7.37e-05) (7.39e-05) (6.87e-05) (8.59e-05) 
log(population)    -0.0141 -0.0108 -0.0209 -0.0303 -0.0269 
    (0.0190) (0.0192) (0.0218) (0.0205) (0.0259) 
Consumer Price Inflation     -2.79e-05 -0.000177 -0.000348 -0.000430 
     (0.000550) (0.000520) (0.000503) (0.000460) 
        - 
Openness (Exports + Imports)/GDP)      -0.000787 -0.000986 0.00164*** 
      (0.000676) (0.000691) (0.000604) 
Gross Domestic Savings (% of GDP)       0.00108 -0.000591 
       (0.00136) (0.00135) 
Taxes on International Trade (% of Revenue)        0.00287* 
        (0.00167) 
Constant 3.891*** 2.395*** 2.284*** 2.313*** 2.190*** 2.175*** 2.613*** 0.945 
 (0.164) (0.797) (0.823) (0.797) (0.824) (0.797) (0.833) (0.993) 
 
 
Observations 
R-squared 
 
 
 
1,315 
 
0.024 
 
 
 
1,315 
 
0.074 
 
 
 
1,315 
 
0.078 
 
 
 
1,315 
 
0.090 
 
 
 
1,181 
 
0.087 
 
 
 
1,181 
 
0.114 
 
 
 
1,101 
 
0.131 
 
 
 
519 
 
0.260 
 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
Table 5, PANEL B: African countries, suggests that the pooled OLS regressions for African 
countries in the sample do not support the Kuznets curve hypothesis of an inverse U-shaped 
relationship between net income inequality and the level of economic development. Columns 
(1) and (2) indicate statistical evidence of a negative relationship between natural resource rents 
and net income inequality. After controlling for level of population, price stability, trade 
openness, domestic savings, and taxes on international trade, this relationship is not robust for 
the African countries using the pooled OLS estimator. 
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TABLE 5: EFFECTS OF NATURAL RESOURCES ON NET INCOME INEQUALITY (POOLED OLS BASELINE) 
 
Dependent Variable(log) 
 
Gini(1) 
 
Gini(2) 
 
Gini(3) 
 
Gini(4) 
 
Gini(5) 
 
Gini(6) 
 
Gini(7) 
 
Gini(8) 
 
PANEL B: AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
 
Income (t) 
 
0.0476 
 
-0.298 
 
-0.306 
 
-0.242 
 
-0.253 
 
-0.253 
 
-0.459 
 
-0.226 
 (0.0287) (0.390) (0.396) (0.430) (0.434) (0.435) (0.430) (0.444) 
Income Squared (t)  0.0223 0.0227 0.0186 0.0195 0.0195 0.0327 0.0223 
  (0.0257) (0.0260) (0.0284) (0.0287) (0.0285) (0.0282) (0.0285) 
 - -       
Resource Rents (t) 0.00217* 0.00236* -0.00351 -0.00163 -0.00154 -0.00151 -0.00203 0.00209 
 (0.00123) (0.00131) (0.00494) (0.00461) (0.00453) (0.00469) (0.00420) (0.00750) 
Resource Rents Squared (t)   2.54e-05 -6.10e-06 -8.40e-06 -8.08e-06 1.46e-05 8.86e-06 
   (9.20e- (8.63e-     
   05) 05) (8.40e-05) (8.28e-05) (7.47e-05) (0.000129) 
Log (population)    -0.0152 -0.0124 -0.0128 -0.0154 -0.0169 
    (0.0176) (0.0180) (0.0196) (0.0155) (0.0237) 
Consumer Price Inflation     0.000671 0.000663 0.000267 0.000978** 
     (0.000600) (0.000580) (0.000655) (0.000364) 
Openness (Exports + Imports)/GDP)      -4.28e-05 -0.000342 -0.00197** 
      (0.000738) (0.000746) (0.000853) 
Gross Domestic Savings (% of GDP)       -0.000276 -0.00234 
       (0.00145) (0.00170) 
Taxes on International Trade (% of Revenue)        0.00220 
        (0.00152) 
Constant 3.445*** 4.769*** 4.816*** 4.784*** 4.762*** 4.766*** 5.622*** 4.526*** 
 (0.206) (1.471) (1.504) (1.558) (1.570) (1.557) (1.579) (1.563) 
 
Observations 
R-squared 
 
 
1,107 
 
0.119 
 
 
1,107 
 
0.135 
 
 
1,107 
 
0.135 
 
 
1,107 
 
0.152 
 
 
988 
 
0.152 
 
 
988 
 
0.152 
 
 
908 
 
0.177 
 
 
408 
 
0.288 
 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
Table 5, PANEL C: Non-African counties suggests that the pooled OLS regressions for non- 
African or Middle East countries also do not support the Kuznets curve hypothesis of a robust 
inverse U-shaped relationship between net income inequality and the level of economic 
development. Columns (3), (4), (5), and (6) suggest possible statistical evidence of an inverse 
U-shaped relationship between natural resource rents and net income inequality. For the poor- 
resource countries, more rents accumulated from resources widen income inequality (as 
indicated by the rise in the Gini coefficient), while resource-rich countries narrow the income 
inequality gap, with more accumulation of natural resource rents. After controlling for level of 
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population, price stability, trade openness, domestic savings, and taxes on international trade, 
this relationship is not statistically significant using the pooled OLS estimator. 
 
 
 
TABLE 5: EFFECTS OF NATURAL RESOURCES ON NET INCOME INEQUALITY (POOLED OLS BASELINE) 
 
Dependent Variable(log) 
 
Gini(1) 
 
Gini(2) 
 
Gini(3) 
 
Gini(4) 
 
Gini(5) 
 
Gini(6) 
 
Gini(7) 
 
Gini(8) 
PANEL C: NON-AFRICAN COUNTRIES (OR SELECT MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES) 
Income (t) -0.0190 0.394 0.583 0.0360 -0.0732 0.548 0.583 -0.303 
 (0.0225) (0.700) (0.410) (0.474) (0.503) (0.379) (0.395) (0.900) 
Income Squared (t) -0.0217 -0.0312 -0.00136 0.00468 -0.0288 -0.0320 0.0182 
 (0.0369) (0.0214) (0.0250) (0.0266) (0.0198) (0.0204) (0.0460) 
Resource Rents (t) 0.00233 0.00289 0.0146*** 0.00720 0.00695 0.0102*** 0.00762* 0.00767 
 (0.00205) (0.00266) (0.00292) (0.00432) (0.00415) (0.00281) (0.00352) (0.00582) 
  - -  - -  
Resource Rents Squared (t)  0.000302*** 0.000179** -0.000175** 0.000222*** 0.000200*** -8.29e-05 
  (5.26e-05) (6.83e-05) (6.54e-05) (4.17e-05) (4.47e-05) (0.000122) 
log(population)   0.0523* 0.0586* -0.00540 -0.0176 0.0643 
   (0.0285) (0.0276) (0.0191) (0.0232) (0.0424) 
    - - -  
Consumer Price Inflation    0.000522*** 0.000728*** 0.000720*** -0.000409 
    (0.000158) (0.000186) (0.000170) (0.000234) 
Openness (Exports + Imports)/GDP)     -0.00137*** -0.00158*** -0.000160 
     (0.000418) (0.000438) (0.000870) 
Gross Domestic Savings (% of GDP)  0.00177 -0.00109 
  (0.00138) (0.00169) 
Taxes on International Trade    
(% of Revenue)   0.00988** 
   (0.00371) 
Constant 3.745*** 1.799 0.852 2.560 2.954 1.201 1.355 3.762 
 (0.198) (3.269) (1.937) (2.039) (2.165) (1.605) (1.702) (3.780) 
 
 
Observations 
 
 
208 
 
 
208 
 
 
208 
 
 
208 
 
 
193 
 
 
193 
 
 
193 
 
 
111 
R-squared 0.101 0.130 0.345 0.481 0.530 0.640 0.652 0.849 
 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
4.4.4 Natural resources and income inequality: Controlling for year and country fixed 
effects 
 
Table 6, PANEL A: All countries, suggests that after controlling for year and country fixed 
effects, a U-shaped relationship is present between net income inequality and the level of 
economic development. Resource rents have a statistically significant and strong U-shaped 
relationship with income inequality. Therefore, for countries with low natural resources, more 
rents lower income inequality, while for resource-rich countries, more accumulation of natural 
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resource rents relates to greater income inequality. This result suggests that the resource curse 
strikes at a certain level of natural resource endowment. In column (8) larger taxes imposed on 
international trade are predicted, on average, to widen income inequality. 
 
 
TABLE 6: EFFECTS OF NATURAL RESOURCES ON NET INCOME INEQUALITY (POOLED OLS BASELINE): NATURAL 
RESOURCE CATEGORIES 
Dependent Variable (log) Gini(1) Gini(2) Gini(3) Gini(4) Gini(5) Gini(6) Gini(7) Gini(8) 
PANEL A: ALL COUNTRIES 
Income (t) -0.0369 0.347 0.347 0.373* 0.375* 0.466* 0.487** 0.565* 
 (0.0282) (0.225) (0.225) (0.211) (0.214) (0.235) (0.237) (0.287) 
      - -  
      0.0286* 0.0302*  
Income Squared (t)  -0.0222* -0.0222* -0.0243* -0.0243* * * -0.0328** 
  (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0123) (0.0124) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0159) 
 0.0978** 0.0923** 0.0923** 0.102** 0.113** 0.109** 0.111**  
Coal Rents * * * * * * * 0.104*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0169) (0.0180) (0.0187) (0.0173) (0.0161) 
    - -    
  - - 0.00049 0.00062 0.00030   
Mineral Rents 0.000290 0.000303 0.000303 8 3 6 -0.00176 0.00800 
 (0.00380 (0.00355 (0.00355 (0.00378 (0.00360 (0.00365 (0.00275  
 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) (0.00501) 
    - -  -  
 -   0.00046 0.00028  0.00034 0.00469** 
Oil Rents 0.000761 -0.00126 -0.00126 2 6 8.62e-05 4 * 
 (0.00166 (0.00165 (0.00165 (0.00156 (0.00155 (0.00164 (0.00181  
 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) (0.00171) 
 -        
 0.00561*     0.00075   
Forest Rents * -0.00122 -0.00122 -0.00127 -0.00107 3 0.00365 0.00359 
 (0.00264 (0.00277 (0.00277 (0.00267 (0.00273 (0.00303 (0.00378  
 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) (0.00491) 
       0.00013  
Natural Gas Rents -0.0108 0.00379 0.00379 0.0115 0.0114 0.00776 8 -0.0235 
 (0.0247) (0.0308) (0.0308) (0.0284) (0.0285) (0.0274) (0.0274) (0.0369) 
    2.638** 2.588**  2.432**  
Constant 4.055*** 2.419** 2.419** * * 2.339** * 1.904* 
 (0.215) (0.951) (0.951) (0.880) (0.909) (0.901) (0.897) (1.118) 
CONTROLS 
Observations 
R-squared 
 
 
1,256 
0.183 
 
 
1,256 
0.214 
YES 
1,256 
0.214 
YES 
1,256 
0.236 
YES 
1,144 
0.254 
YES 
1,144 
0.282 
YES 
1,064 
0.347 
YES 
518 
0.512 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses 
 
 
In Table 6, PANEL B: African countries, column (7) suggests that after controlling for 
population levels and inflation, the degree of trade openness and savings share a U-shaped 
relationship between natural resources and income inequality, driven by the African countries’ 
dynamics. Surprisingly, income inequality and the level of economic development do not have 
a robust relationship for African countries. In column (8), controlling for taxes suggests that the 
natural resources rents do not statistically affect income inequality, but rather the gross savings 
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share of GDP explain the income inequality changes. Therefore, a rise in the GDP savings share 
for the given level of international trade tax revenue share will 
lower the income inequality in the country for any given level of natural resource rents. 
 
 
TABLE 6: EFFECTS OF NATURAL RESOURCES ON NET INCOME INEQUALITY (POOLED OLS BASELINE): NATURAL RESOURCE 
CATEGORIES 
DependentVariable(log) Gini(1) Gini(2) Gini(3) Gini(4) Gini(5) Gini(6) Gini(7) Gini(8) 
PANEL B: AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
Income (t) 0.0418 -0.0594 -0.0594 0.0107 0.112 0.107 0.0164 -0.0412 
 (0.0382) (0.353) (0.353) (0.365) (0.372) (0.385) (0.355) (0.431) 
Income Squared (t)  0.00636 0.00636 0.00119 -0.00547 -0.00537 0.000415 0.00690 
  (0.0233) (0.0233) (0.0243) (0.0249) (0.0252) (0.0234) (0.0275) 
Coal Rents 0.0583*** 0.0566** 0.0566** 0.0693** 0.0819** 0.0825*** 0.0844*** 0.0681** 
 (0.0213) (0.0245) (0.0245) (0.0264) (0.0315) (0.0307) (0.0304) (0.0311) 
Mineral Rents -0.00140 -0.00126 -0.00126 -0.00140 -0.00161 -0.00173 -0.00299 0.00859 
 (0.00340) (0.00333) (0.00333) (0.00355) (0.00331) (0.00340) (0.00255) (0.00534) 
Oil Rents -0.00143 -0.00137 -0.00137 -0.000610 -0.000511 -0.000579 0.000102 0.00366 
 (0.00151) (0.00147) (0.00147) (0.00142) (0.00139) (0.00151) (0.00162) (0.00223) 
Forest Rents -0.00231 -0.00288 -0.00288 -0.00290 -0.00251 -0.00270 -0.00174 -0.00394 
 (0.00267) (0.00224) (0.00224) (0.00216) (0.00213) (0.00239) (0.00247) (0.00487) 
Natural Gas Rents -0.0837** -0.0840** -0.0840** -0.0649 -0.0620 -0.0618 -0.0576 -0.0522 
 (0.0366) (0.0370) (0.0370) (0.0408) (0.0388) (0.0381) (0.0396) (0.0402) 
Constant 3.479*** 3.879*** 3.879*** 3.926*** 3.519** 3.528** 3.999*** 4.111** 
 (0.284) (1.339) (1.339) (1.345) (1.342) (1.370) (1.316) (1.529) 
CONTROLS 
Observations 
R-squared 
 
 
1,050 
0.258 
 
 
1,050 
0.259 
YES 
1,050 
0.259 
YES 
1,050 
0.281 
YES 
952 
0.297 
YES 
952 
0.297 
YES 
872 
0.344 
YES 
407 
0.474 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
In Table 6, PANEL C: Non-African countries, columns (1) to (7) indicate that natural resource 
rents are related to lower income inequality for the sampled Middle East countries. In column 
(8), after controlling for tax revenue share on international trade, the relationship is not 
statistically significant. Furthermore, population increases, higher prices and lower gross 
domestic savings will exacerbate the income inequality gap. 
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TABLE 6: EFFECTS OF NATURAL RESOURCES ON NET INCOME INEQUALITY (POOLED OLS BASELINE): NATURAL RESOURCE 
CATEGORIES 
 
Dependent Variable (log) 
 
Gini(1) 
 
Gini(2) 
 
Gini(3) 
 
Gini(4) 
 
Gini(5) 
 
Gini(6) 
 
Gini(7) 
 
Gini(8) 
 
PANEL C. NON-AFRICAN COUNTRIES (MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES) 
 
Income (t) 
 
-0.0300 
 
-0.161 
 
-0.161 
 
-0.339 
 
-0.543 
 
-0.100 
 
-0.0727 
 
-1.262 
 (0.0209) (0.434) (0.434) (0.420) (0.434) (0.356) (0.360) (0.819) 
Income Squared (t)  0.00694 0.00694 0.0174 0.0285 0.00456 0.00229 0.0659 
  (0.0228) (0.0228) (0.0222) (0.0229) (0.0186) (0.0190) (0.0424) 
 
Coal Rents 
 
8.180*** 
 
8.629*** 
 
8.629*** 
 
5.970*** 
 
6.488*** 
 
6.724*** 
 
6.707*** 
 
1.792 
 (0.951) (1.799) (1.799) (1.610) (1.453) (1.593) (1.407) (0.988) 
Mineral Rents -0.0121 -0.0108 -0.0108 -0.0169 -0.0126 -0.00382 -0.00326 -0.00308 
 (0.0132) (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0167) (0.0156) (0.0131) (0.0129) (0.00572) 
Oil Rents -0.000266 -0.000417 -0.000417 -0.00191 -0.00187 -0.000875 -0.00182 0.00247 
 (0.00128) (0.00125) (0.00125) (0.00149) (0.00136) (0.00134) (0.00153) (0.00133) 
Forest Rents 0.391*** 0.388*** 0.388*** 0.321*** 0.332*** 0.325*** 0.303*** 1.004*** 
 (0.0668) (0.0601) (0.0601) (0.0416) (0.0481) (0.0567) (0.0548) (0.107) 
Natural Gas Rents 0.0342** 0.0319** 0.0319** 0.0289* 0.0241* 0.0251** 0.0204* -0.00221 
 (0.0136) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0131) (0.0114) (0.00919) (0.0104) (0.0305) 
Constant 3.824*** 4.435* 4.435* 4.523** 5.373** 4.237** 4.330** 8.701** 
 (0.179) (2.027) (2.027) (1.879) (1.930) (1.565) (1.515) (3.634) 
 
CONTROLS 
Observations 
R-squared 
 
 
 
206 
 
0.510 
 
 
 
206 
 
0.512 
 
YES 
 
206 
 
0.512 
 
YES 
 
206 
 
0.612 
 
YES 
 
192 
 
0.664 
 
YES 
 
192 
 
0.745 
 
YES 
 
192 
 
0.750 
 
YES 
 
111 
 
0.926 
 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
 
Generally, Table 7, PANEL A: All countries, suggests that for the sample countries, mineral 
and oil rents are related to lower income inequality levels, after controlling for year and country 
fixed effects. In Table 7, PANEL B: African countries columns (6), (7), and (8) indicate that in 
Africa more coal rents worsen income inequality, while mineral rents are related with the 
lowering of income inequality. In Table 7, PANEL C: Non-African countries, the statistically 
significant coefficients in columns (1) to (6) suggest that for Middle East countries, coal rents, 
mineral rents, and oil rents lower income inequality, while forest rents are associated with wider 
income inequalities. 
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TABLE 7: EFFECTS OF NATURAL RESOURCES ON NET INCOME INEQUALITY (FIXED EFFECTS) 
 
Dependent Variable(log) 
 
Gini(1) 
 
Gini(2) 
 
Gini(3) 
 
Gini(4) 
 
Gini(5) 
 
Gini(6) 
 
Gini(7) 
 
Gini(8) 
 
PANEL A: ALL COUNTRIES 
 
Income (t) 
 
0.0719** 
 
-0.288* 
 
-0.299* 
 
-0.289* 
 
-0.344* 
 
-0.343* 
 
-0.320 
 
-0.412 
 
(0.0288) (0.160) (0.159) (0.171) (0.176) (0.178) (0.225) (0.305) 
Income Squared (t) 
 
0.0231** 0.0237** 0.0230** 0.0256** 0.0255** 0.0241* 0.0327* 
  (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0113) (0.0116) (0.0117) (0.0142) (0.0176) 
 - - - - - - - - 
Resource Rents (t) 0.00120** 0.00132*** 0.00257*** 0.00256*** 0.00313*** 0.00309*** 0.00362*** 0.00318*** 
 
(0.000481) (0.000469) (0.000968) (0.000953) (0.000928) (0.000909) (0.000796) (0.00118) 
Resource Rents Squared       4.24e- 4.43e- 
(t)   2.57e-05* 2.56e-05* 3.40e-05** 3.36e-05** 05*** 05*** 
   
(1.39e-05) (1.38e-05) (1.35e-05) (1.33e-05) (1.13e-05) (1.50e-05) 
log(population) 
   
-0.0120 -0.0424 -0.0432 -0.0486 0.0510 
    
(0.0469) (0.0555) (0.0565) (0.0616) (0.0598) 
Consumer Price Inflation 
    
-7.32e-05 -7.37e-05 -6.67e-05 6.52e-05 
     
(8.83e-05) (8.83e-05) (9.48e-05) (0.000113) 
Openness (Exports +         
Imports)/GDP      -2.93e-05 -1.17e-06 -0.000201 
      
(0.000106) (0.000137) (0.000162) 
Gross Domestic Savings         
(% of GDP)       -0.000283 -0.000865 
       
(0.000489) (0.000527) 
Taxes on International         
Trade (% of Revenue)        0.00160** 
        
(0.000707) 
Constant 2.959*** 4.340*** 4.398*** 4.552*** 5.325*** 5.334*** 5.337*** 3.811** 
 
(0.254) (0.615) (0.617) (0.827) (0.935) (0.939) (1.113) (1.816) 
 
Observations 
R-squared 
 
 
 
1,315 
 
0.959 
 
 
 
1,315 
 
0.961 
 
 
 
1,315 
 
0.962 
 
 
 
1,315 
 
0.962 
 
 
 
1,181 
 
0.963 
 
 
 
1,181 
 
0.963 
 
 
 
1,101 
 
0.960 
 
 
 
519 
 
0.983 
 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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TABLE 7: Effects of Natural Resources on Net Income Inequality (FIXED EFFECTS) 
 
Dependent Variable(log) 
 
Gini(1) 
 
Gini(2) 
 
Gini(3) 
 
Gini(4) 
 
Gini(5) 
 
Gini(6) 
 
Gini(7) 
 
Gini(8) 
 
PANEL B: AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
 
Income (t) 
 
0.0479* 
 
-0.0879 
 
-0.104 
 
-0.0262 
 
0.000216 
 
0.0202 
 
0.168 
 
0.390 
 
(0.0280) (0.174) (0.179) (0.212) (0.280) (0.292) (0.394) (0.329) 
Income Squared (t) 
 
0.00911 0.0100 0.00494 0.00167 0.000253 -0.00924 -0.0199 
  (0.0122) (0.0126) (0.0148) (0.0192) (0.0201) (0.0263) (0.0196) 
     -  -  
Resource Rents (t) -0.00109* -0.00114* -0.00203 -0.00187 0.00223* -0.00208* 0.00286*** -0.00200 
 
(0.000580) (0.000582) (0.00126) (0.00117) (0.00117) (0.00115) (0.00104) (0.00141) 
Resource Rents Squared (t) 
  
1.80e-05 1.62e-05 2.20e-05 2.00e-05 2.90e-05* 2.49e-05 
   (1.76e- (1.68e- (1.65e-    
   05) 05) 05) (1.64e-05) (1.47e-05) (1.79e-05) 
log(population) 
   
-0.0655 -0.179* -0.184* -0.233** 0.0176 
    
(0.0863) (0.0985) (0.0998) (0.104) (0.117) 
Consumer Price Inflation 
    
-1.51e-05 -2.28e-05 3.57e-05 0.000238 
     (8.43e-    
     05) (8.75e-05) (9.73e-05) (0.000154) 
Openness (Exports + Imports)/GDP) 
     
-9.30e-05 2.64e-06 -0.000268 
      
(0.000140) (0.000166) (0.000173) 
Gross Domestic Savings (% of GDP) 
      
-9.80e-06 -0.000728* 
       
(0.000371) (0.000400) 
Taxes on International Trade (% of         
Revenue)        0.00119*** 
        
(0.000418) 
Constant 3.161*** 3.655*** 3.726*** 4.480*** 6.284*** 6.304*** 6.516*** 1.375 
 
(0.251) (0.614) (0.642) (1.265) (1.386) (1.383) (1.514) (2.533) 
 
 
Observations 
R-squared 
 
 
 
1,107 
 
0.956 
 
 
 
1,107 
 
0.956 
 
 
 
1,107 
 
0.956 
 
 
 
1,107 
 
0.957 
 
 
 
988 
 
0.960 
 
 
 
988 
 
0.961 
 
 
 
908 
 
0.956 
 
 
 
408 
 
0.987 
 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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TABLE 7: EFFECTS OF NATURAL RESOURCES ON NET INCOME INEQUALITY (FIXED EFFECTS) 
 
Dependent Variable(log) 
 
Gini(1) 
 
Gini(2) 
 
Gini(3) 
 
Gini(4) 
 
Gini(5) 
 
Gini(6) 
 
Gini(7) 
 
Gini(8) 
PANEL C: NON-AFRICAN COUNTRIES (MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES) 
Income (t) 0.249* -2.729*** -2.625*** -2.925*** -2.873*** -2.874*** -2.876*** -1.863 
 (0.118) (0.439) (0.487) (0.518) (0.563) (0.562) (0.555) (1.250) 
Income Squared (t)  0.155*** 0.150*** 0.168*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.114 
  (0.0238) (0.0264) (0.0274) (0.0303) (0.0302) (0.0297) (0.0646) 
 -      
Resource Rents (t) 0.00405*** -0.00138** -0.00331* -0.00225 -0.00271* -0.00258* -0.00260* -0.000277 
 (0.00117) (0.000546) (0.00149) (0.00153) (0.00148) (0.00136) (0.00140) (0.00321) 
Resource Rents Squared (t) 3.63e-05 1.72e-05 2.49e-05 2.46e-05 2.45e-05 -1.17e-06 
 (2.69e-      
 05) (2.38e-05) (2.30e-05) (2.30e-05) (2.23e-05) (7.07e-05) 
log(population)  0.0982*** 0.0959*** 0.0913** 0.0913** 0.0720* 
  (0.0238) (0.0302) (0.0304) (0.0308) (0.0338) 
Consumer Price Inflation   4.11e-06 8.63e-06 9.06e-06 0.000124*** 
   (0.000137) (0.000135) (0.000126) (1.77e-05) 
Openness (Exports + Imports)/GDP)    -0.000148 -0.000150 -0.000166 
    (0.000108) (0.000124) (0.000180) 
Gross Domestic Savings (% of GDP)     2.76e-05 -0.00251** 
     (0.000728) (0.00102) 
Taxes on International Trade       
(% of Revenue)      0.000900 
      (0.00117) 
Constant 1.478 15.76*** 15.27*** 14.86*** 14.63*** 14.73*** 14.73*** 10.06 
 (1.122) (2.032) (2.260) (2.278) (2.376) (2.323) (2.312) (5.722) 
 
 
Observations 
 
 
208 
 
 
208 
 
 
208 
 
 
208 
 
 
193 
 
 
193 
 
 
193 
 
 
111 
R-squared 0.940 0.976 0.976 0.982 0.984 0.984 0.984 0.992 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
4.5 Limitation of the Findings 
 
 
The problems of endogeneity bias, be it simultaneity, measurement error, or omitted variables 
(such as corruption levels, which impacts natural resource rents and economic growth or income 
inequality) were not exhaustibly addressed, which can lead to upward or downward bias of 
estimators, including classical inference weaknesses. 
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Regarding income inequality and the natural resource curse regression model, the omitted 
variable biases and other forms of endogeneity can either under or overestimate the natural 
resource rents effects. This would most likely occur should the natural resource rents be 
correlated with unobserved characteristics that have not been controlled for or dealt with. 
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CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 
As the study has carried out various regression model analyses with various outcomes, this 
chapter summarises the key findings, discusses empirical significance of the findings in relation 
to literature, and in conclusion suggests avenues for future research. 
 
5.2 Summary Discussion of Findings 
 
 
This study sets out to examine if the relationship between resource abundance and income 
inequality amongst a panel of African countries is negative as in the case between resource 
abundance and economic growth of the resource curse hypothesis literature. The study is carried 
out with the objective of testing whether economic inequality would be a more appropriate 
measure of the performance of resource-rich nations, as lower or higher levels of growth have 
untested inference on inequality. 
 
The study found the existence of a U-shaped relationship between resource rent and income 
inequality, which supports the literature regarding the Kuznets curve. The study also found that 
rising consumer price inflation significantly worsens average income inequality within an 
African country. In addition, a high degree of trade openness significantly reduces income 
inequality within an African country, if all else is held constant. This advocates for policies 
advancing a high degree of trade openness rather than protectionism in Africa in the fight to 
alleviate high income inequality. 
 
Furthermore, higher gross domestic savings share in GDP is predicted to significantly reduce 
income inequality. This continues the theme of encouraging African countries to prioritise 
improving the domestic savings share vis-à-vis debt-driven economic growth and curtailing 
income inequality. 
 
Therefore, for African countries based on the population level, inflation level, degree of trade 
openness, and GDP share of domestic savings, accumulation of more coal rents share is 
expected to worsen average income inequality, while more mineral resource rents share reduces 
income inequality. 
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With regards to the first objective of the thesis pertaining to the natural resource curse and 
economic growth in Africa, the evidence is mixed and is dependent on the econometric model 
used and the controls included. As this study accounted for economic business cycles and 
country fixed effects, it was observed that there is some evidence of the natural resource curse 
having an impact on natural resource-rich African countries, which can be explained by the 
level of inflation, degree of trade openness, domestic GDP saving share, and the international 
tax revenue share. On the African natural resource analysis, there is some strong evidence of 
the natural resource curse permeating through the forest rents. High forest rents are associated 
with low average annual growth rates. When the study accounted for year and country fixed 
effects, it was observed that trade openness robustly elevates economic growth in Africa, while 
the gross domestic savings rate robustly drives growth in the sampled Middle East countries. 
This echoes the sentiments that in the Middle East, diversification into other industries, 
investment in human capital and technology, and encouragement of real savings would assist 
the countries to escape the natural resource curse. 
 
5.3 Policy Recommendations of the Findings 
 
 
At a minimum, African countries facing mineral booms should focus their attention on the 
problem of income inequality and pay special attention to the ability of workers to move from 
the trading sector, typically agriculture and manufacturing, to the non-trading sector, generally 
services  African governments should also adopt policies that can help prevent the economy 
from growing overly dependent on a single commodity post a mineral boom, and should rather 
post in places a variety of measures and policies which would encourage competition and 
productivity in the sectors which are usually unprotected, namely the manufacturing and 
agricultural sectors (Ross, 2007). 
 
African governments must continue to try and diversify the risk of path dependency on coal- 
powered energy, as coal rents seem to be associated with worsening income inequality. They 
should keep investing the mineral rents in productive human capital and social empowerment 
programmes. This analysis opines that for Africans to develop sound natural resource credit 
management systems, it would be key to improve the quality of political institutions. That is, to 
incentivise or encourage good governance schemes, curtail the levels of systematic corruption 
embattling most of the business and political spectrum, and enforce the rule of law 
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justly to stifle embezzlement of natural resource rents. Such measures could be key in 
circumventing the natural resource curse and spurring economic growth. 
 
The “Alaska-type direct distribution plan has not been tried in a developing state where 
institutions tend to be weak”, which is mostly the case in African countries (Ross, 2007). If 
implemented successfully, “it would allocate mineral revenues in an admirably equitable way”, 
enabling government to control income inequality as they focus on income redistributive 
policies (Ross, 2007). The downside is that if the plan is unsuccessfully implemented, the plan 
would result in rent-seeking and corruptive crowding-out tendencies. 
 
This study supports the findings by Ross, (2007) that “a less risky approach would be to adopt 
policies that narrow the income gap between the extractive region and the rest of the country”. 
The divide between the income levels in countries which heavy reliance on the extractive 
industries as a result of mineral resource abundance, should be managed with policies targeting 
the reduction of the gap between income levels. 
 
5.4 Avenues for Future Research 
 
 
Data on income inequality is almost non-existent for mineral-rich countries on the African 
continent. Future research should focus primarily on exploring methods to gather data which is 
reflect a true reflection of the level of inequality in African countries. This research would be 
an invaluable contribution to the furthering the understanding and measurement of the 
relationship between natural resource endowment and income amongst mineral rich developing 
states. What should be a complimentary future area of research should be the manner in which 
income inequality exists in resource rich developing countries, which should be investigated 
looking at the income distribution patterns among these countries particularly during the periods 
post increase economic activity driven by mineral resources. Ross (2007) echoes the sentiment 
of this study in relation to future avenues of research as he finds that to fully understand the 
nature of the relationship between resource wealth and income inequality data collection is vital.  
Further investigation of this relationship which has been an explored area of modern finance 
given the lack of data from mineral resource rich countries it certainly required. The collection 
of data on income inequality and its impact from mineral resource booms will certainly advance 
the academic field of study relating to the natural resource hypothesis. 
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Appendix 1 – List of Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: Africa total resource rents and income per capita: Cross-sectional relationship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Resource rents and income per capita: Nonparametric progression 
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Figure 3: Oil wealth and income per capita: Cross-sectional relationship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Total resource rents and net income inequality: Cross-sectional relationship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1. OIL WEALTH AND INCOME PER CAPITA: Cross-Sectional Relationship over 
1929-2008 
-.1 
Average Oil Wealth Average Oil Wealth 
.05 .1 
Notes: ASPO data(1929-2008) used by Cotet & Tsui(2013) 
FIGURE 4.TOTAL RESOURCE RENTS AND NET INCOME INEQUALITY: Cross-Sectional Relationship over 
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Figure 5: Resource rents and net income inequality: Nonparametric regression 
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Figure 6: Correlation Matrix using ASPO Data 
 
Figure 7.1: PANEL A. Correlation Matrix for ASPO DATA (ALL COUNTRIES) 
 
Variable 
 
Gini 
 
Log(Gini) 
 
Log(Inc) 
Log(Oil 
Wealth) 
Log(Pop. 
Density) 
 
Democracy 
Growth 
Rate 
Gini 1.0000       
Log(Gini) 0.9928 1.0000      
 -       
Log(Income) 0.2875 -0.3232 1.0000     
Log(Oil Wealth per        
capita) 0.0903 0.0906 0.1806 1.0000    
 -       
Log(Population Density) 0.2207 -0.2117 -0.1521 -0.2069 1.0000   
 -       
Democracy 0.1550 -0.1848 0.3351 -0.0401 0.0500 1.0000  
 -       
Growth Rate 0.1229 -0.1219 -0.0224 -0.0904 0.1429 0.0505 1.0000 
 
Figure 7.2: PANEL B. Correlation Matrix for ASPO DATA (AFRICAN COUNTRIES) 
 
Variable 
 
Gini 
 
Log(Gini) 
 
Log(Inc) 
Log(Oil 
Wealth) 
Log(Pop. 
Density) 
 
Democracy 
Growth 
Rate 
Gini 1.0000       
Log(Gini) 0.9985 1.0000      
 -       
Log(Income) 0.1969 -0.1997 1.0000     
Log(Oil Wealth per        
capita) 0.0934 0.0784 -0.0137 1.0000    
Log(Population Density) 0.5287 0.5513 -0.2003 0.3879 1.0000   
Democracy 0.1247 0.1190 -0.0399 0.2013 0.1087 1.0000  
Growth Rate 0.0639 0.0588 0.1143 0.0309 0.1475 0.0449 1.0000 
 
Figure 7.3: PANEL C. Correlation Matrix for ASPO DATA (NON-AFRICAN COUNTRIES) 
 
Variable 
 
Gini 
 
Log(Gini) 
 
Log(Inc) 
Log(Oil 
Wealth) 
Log(Pop. 
Density) 
 
Democracy 
Growth 
Rate 
Gini 1.0000       
Log(Gini) 0.9932 1.0000      
 -       
Log(Income) 0.2723 -0.3042 1.0000     
Log(Oil Wealth per        
capita) 0.1049 0.1090 0.1955 1.0000    
 -       
Log(Population Density) 0.2337 -0.2195 -0.1866 -0.2991 1.0000   
 -       
Democracy 0.1222 -0.1412 0.2834 -0.0979 -0.0085 1.0000  
 -       
Growth Rate 0.1249 -0.1211 -0.0518 -0.1176 0.1338 0.0190 1.0000 
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Figure 7: List of Countries used in the study. 
 
 
List of Countries 
 
Algeria Kuwait Tunisia 
Angola Lebanon Uganda 
United Arab 
Bahrain Lesotho Emirates 
Benin Liberia West Bank and Gaza 
Botswana Libya Yemen, Rep. 
Burkina Faso Madagascar Zambia 
Burundi Malawi Zimbabwe 
Cabo Verde Mali 
Cameroon Malta 
Central African Republic Mauritania 
Chad Mauritius 
Comoros Morocco 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Mozambique 
Congo, Rep. Namibia 
Cote d'Ivoire Niger 
Djibouti Nigeria 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Oman 
Equatorial Guinea Qatar 
Eritrea Rwanda 
Eswatini Sao Tome and Principe 
Ethiopia Saudi Arabia 
Gabon Senegal 
Gambia, The Seychelles 
Ghana Sierra Leone 
Guinea Somalia 
Guinea-Bissau South Africa 
Iran, Islamic Rep. South Sudan 
Iraq Sudan 
Syrian Arab 
Israel Republic 
Jordan Tanzania 
Kenya Togo 
